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This work presents two speech hiding methods based on a bio-inspired concept 
known as the ability of adaptation of speech signals. A cryptographic model uses the 
adaptation to transform a secret message to a non-sensitive target speech signal, and 
then, the scrambled speech signal is an intelligible signal. The residual intelligibility is 
extremely low and it is appropriate to transmit secure speech signals. On the other 
hand, in a steganographic model, the adapted speech signal is hidden into a host signal 
by using indirect substitution or direct substitution. In the first case, the scheme is 
known as Efficient Wavelet Masking (EWM), and in the second case, it is known as 
improved-EWM (iEWM).  While EWM demonstrated to be highly statistical transparent, 
the second one, iEWM, demonstrated to be highly robust against signal manipulations. 
Finally, with the purpose to transmit secure speech signals in real-time operation, a 
hardware-based scheme is proposed. 
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Like the chameleon which adapts to the surrounding 
environment, changing its color to become "imperceptible” 
and not be detected by enemies, a good mechanism to hide a 
speech signal is to adapt it to a non-sensitive speech one. 
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The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the motivation of the research and the 
objectives to overcome the problem. It gives the reader an overview of the 

















1.1. Research topic 
With the growth of internet, the quantity and kind of information which is 
transmitted increases day by day. Everybody wants to transmit data into secure 
channels; but despite the levels of security have improved the ways for stealing the 
information have improved, too. At this point, is it possible to transmit sensitive 
information through vulnerable channels -as internet- without compromising the 
secrecy of data? The answer is related to data hiding which involves cryptography, 
watermarking and steganography. 
In cryptography, secret data is transformed according to a key so that they 
resemble unknown messages. If the encrypted message is intercepted by a non-
authorized user, he/she knows that a secret message is being transmitted; however 
he/she cannot discover the secret message without the knowledge of the secret key. 
Therefore, the aim of cryptography is to save the secrecy of data. 
On the other hand, in watermarking and steganography, the secret messages are 
hidden into host signals, e.g. images, audio or video.  While watermarking is mainly 
focused on copyright protection, steganography is focused on covert communication. 
The transmitted signals, watermarked or stego, are legible signals with high similarity 
to the host signals and the purpose is to not generate suspicions about the existence of 
the secret message. It means that if the transmitted signal is intercepted by a non-
authorized user, he/she does not suspect about the secrecy of the information.   
Although the purpose of watermarking and steganography is not the same, they 
satisfy, with different order of priority, the following characteristics: transparency, 
hiding capacity (HC) and robustness.  Transparency means a high similarity between 
the transmitted and the host signal, hiding capacity is the quantity of information that 
is hidden into the host signal, and robustness is the ability to resist signal manipulation 
1.2. Research problem 
Nowadays, concealment of speech signals is a great interest area for both users 
and researchers. Since a speech signal contains more information than a single plain-
text (e.g. rhythm and gender of the speaker) and it can be viewed as a signature of their 
owner, the theme of secure speech signals is a topical issue. But, are the current 
techniques of data hiding able to transmit secure speech signals? 
In the case of encryption, most techniques have been focused on encryption of 
plain-text, however, some methods to encrypt speech signals have been proposed. The 
classical approaches are based on permutation (in time, frequency or time-frequency 
domain) in which data are relocated according to a secret key. Some works have used 
Pseudo-Noise (PN) generators, and others, chaotic sequences. However, the problem to 
encrypt speech signals with long time-scale has not been overcome. Another group of 
techniques are based on amplitude scrambling in which the amplitude of the speech 
signal is distorted so that it resembles a noise signal.  The main disadvantage of these 
schemes is that the secret message is not recovered if the amplitude of the encrypted 
signal is slightly modified (e.g. by filtering, re-sampling or re-quantization, among 
others). 
Like cryptography, in the case of steganography, most techniques have been 
proposed to hide plain-text.  One of the most known methods is the Least Significant Bit 
(LSB) substitution in which some bits of the host signal are replaced with the bits of the 
secret message. LSB substitution allows hiding speech signals into speech signals, but 
the behavior of the hiding capacity or/and the robustness is the opposite of the 
transparency, it means, if the transparency of the stego signal increases, then at least 
one between HC and robustness decreases.  Spread Spectrum (SS) and Shift Spectrum 
Algorithm (SSA) give a higher transparency than LSB substitution, but the hiding 
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capacity is lower. Therefore, the time-scale of the secret message must be lower than 
the time-scale of the host speech signal.  On the other hand, Frequency Masking (FM) is 
a method that directly takes advantage of the Human Auditory System (HAS) in which a 
weak sound is masked by a stronger sound. Although its hiding capacity is higher than 
in SS and SSA and its robustness is better than in LSB substitution, the masking process 
is not efficient enough.  
  
1.3. Macro Hypotheses 
In order to overcome the limits of the well-known methods of speech hiding, the 
following macro hypotheses have been used in the current research: 
(i) A permutation-based speech encryption scheme which uses an adaptive 
mechanism to relocate data is a good enough solution to transmit speech 
signals.   
(ii) A steganography model with an efficient application of the masking 
property gives a better trade-off among transparency, hiding capacity and 
robustness than its predecessors. 
(iii) Both schemes, encryption and steganography, can be based on the same 
principle of adaptation.  In the first case, adaptation can help to scramble 
the secret message, while in the second case adaptation can help to mask 
the secret message.  
(iv) In real-time implementation, the adaptive secret key should be obtained 
from small frames. It allows having a secure output with small latency. 
The above macro hypotheses are the basis of the research work.  In the rest of the 








1.4. Aim and objectives 
Once the problem has been detected, the following step is to identify the aim and 
the objectives of the research work.  
The aim of the research work consists in proposing a novel scheme of speech-
in-speech hiding that satisfies the features of security, transparency, robustness 
and hiding capacity. 
To achieve this aim, three objectives are identified that have a strong relationship 
with the macro hypotheses, as follows:  
(i) To propose and validate a novel cryptographic scheme of speech signals 
based on the principle of adaptation of speech signals *.  
(ii) To propose and validate a novel speech-in-speech hiding scheme based on 
the principle of adaptation which has a good enough trade-off among 
transparency, hiding capacity and robustness.  
(iii) To propose and validate a novel real-time speech-in-speech hiding scheme 
with adaptive-key generation. 
* It is worth noting that the first specific objective is new in relation to the original 







According to the macro hypothesis, both cryptography and steganography 
schemes should be based on an adaptation criterion, and therefore the first step is to 
propose a hypothesis of adaptation of speech signals.  Therefore, the hypothesis must 
give a response to the question: is it feasible to adapt a speech signal to a target speech 
signal? And if the answer is positive, which are the requirements of adaptation? 
Once the hypothesis has been proposed, the following step is to validate it 
through exhaustive tests.  
If the results demonstrate that adaptation is feasible, then, the third step is to 
apply speech adaptation into a scrambling scheme. It includes several tests to validate 
speech adaptation as a useful key-generator.  
The fourth step is to apply adaptation into a steganography scheme.  The idea is 
to use adaptation to generate an effective masking between the secret message and the 
host signal. The tests validate the transparency, the hiding capacity and the robustness 
of the stego signal.   
Finally, the scheme of speech-in-speech hiding is modified so that it can be used 












1.6. Chapter descriptions 
The current document encompasses eight chapters. The following seven chapters 
are summarized as follows. 
Chapter 2 shows a background of speech security in terms of steganography and 
cryptography.  Firstly, some definitions of the above techniques are presented, 
secondly, the most important methods of each one are explained and finally, a survey of 
works in the area is shown. 
Chapter 3 defines the hypothesis of adaptation of speech signals. In this chapter 
the idea behind the ability of adaptation, the formulation of the hypothesis, the 
requirements of adaptation, and an algorithm to adapt a speech signal to a target 
speech signal are presented. At the end of the chapter the ability of adaptation is tested 
in two ways: vowels to phrases and vice versa, and phrases to phrases in different 
language or/and gender of the speaker.  
Chapter 4 validates the adaptation as an efficient key-generator into a speech 
scrambling system. Several tests were carried out in order to measure two parameters 
which are strongly related to the residual intelligibility: the number of displacements 
(Γ) and the number of elements which are not coincident in the same positions (HD).  
Chapter 5 presents two schemes of speech-in-speech hiding.  The first one is 
known as Efficient Wavelet Masking (EWM) and the second one as improved-EWM 
(iEMW).  Both of them use the ability of adaptation of speech signals to take advantage 
of the masking property of the HAS. EWM is validated in terms of the statistical 
transparency while iEWM in terms of the robustness.  
Chapter 6 presents a scheme of speech-in-speech hiding on hardware devices. 
Since the schemes presented in Chapter 4 and 5 are not useful for real-time operation, a 
new scheme is proposed. However, it takes advantage of the strengths of its 
predecessors. The hardware performance and the quality of the recovered secret 
message are measured.  
Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of the current works, in terms of the novelty, 
strengths and limits. 





















2. Speech security: background and 
survey 
 
This chapter presents an overview of security techniques applied to speech 
signals.  Firstly, the most important concepts of data hiding and encryption are 









2.1. Basic concepts of information security 
In the area of information security, there are three clearly distinguishable 
concepts: cryptography, steganography and watermarking. Although they can be used 
to transmit information in a secure form, the purpose and the techniques are different 
among them. In the following subsections the main concepts of steganography and 
cryptography focused on speech signals are explained. 
2.1.1.  Steganography 
It encompasses pure steganography, secret key steganography and public key 
steganography. Since the current work uses secret key steganography to transmit the 
secret message, some definitions are selected in order to explain it, as follows: 
“In secret key steganography the sender chooses a cover c and 
embeds the secret message into c using a secret key k. If the key used in the 
embedding process is known to the receiver, he can reverse the process 
and extract the secret message. Anyone who does not know the secret key 
should not be able to obtain evidence of the encoded information”. The 
cover c and the stego-object can be perceptually similar”. [1] 
“Classical steganography concerns itself with ways of embedding a 
secret message (which might be a copyright mark, a covert communication, 
or a serial number) in a cover message (such as a video film, an audio 
recording, or computer code). The embedding is typically parameterized by 
a key; without knowledge of this key (or a related one) it is difficult for a 
third party to detect or remove the embedded material”. [2] 
“The embedded data is the message that one wishes to send secretly.  
It is usually hidden in an innocuous message referred to as a cover-text, or 
12 
 
cover-image or cover-audio as appropriate, producing the stego-text or 
other stego-object. A stego-key is used to control the hiding process so as to 
restrict detection and/or recovery of the embedded data to parties who 
know it (or who know some derived key value)”. [3] 
“Steganography (from the greek ‘‘steganos’’ – covered) is a term 
denoting mechanisms for hiding information within a ‘‘cover’’ such that, 
generally, only an intended recipient will (i) have knowledge of its 
existence, and (ii) will be able to recover it from within its cover”. [4] 
According to the above definitions, four agents interact in a steganography 
system: the secret message, the cover signal, the stego signal and the secret key.  The 
stego signal is the output of the system and the others are inputs to the system. The 
secret message is hidden into the cover signal according to the secret key and the result 
is the stego signal. To recover the secret message, the authorized user must know the 
stego signal and the secret key. Additionally, only the intended recipient should know 
about the existence of the secret message. It is illustrate in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1. Global scheme of secret key steganography 
In any steganographic system there are three inter-related characteristics that 
define its quality: the transparency, the hiding capacity and the robustness of the stego 
signal.  Everyone is explained as follows. 
a) Transparency: the stego signal is transparent if it does not generate suspicious 
about the existence of the secret message.  
“The stego signal is transparent if an average human subject is 
unable to distinguish between the host signal and the stego signal”. [5] 
b) Hiding Capacity: it is related to the amount of information (i.e. quantity of bits) 
hidden into the host signal.  In the case of speech-in-speech hiding, it can be measured 
in terms of the total number of bits hidden by frame or in terms of the time-scale of the 
secret message hidden into a normalized time-scale of the host signal. For example, if a 
speech signal (with sampling frequency , fs, of 8K Hz, and quantization, q, of 16 bits) 
hides 4 bits per sample, then HC=32K [bits/s] or HC=0.25*HCmax (for HCmax = fs * q).  
On the other hand, if a speech signal of 1-second (with fs=8K Hz and q=16-bits) hides a 
secret message of 1-second (with fs=8K Hz and q=4-bits), then HC is 100% in terms of 
time-scale. Although in both cases the total number of replaced bits per frame is the 
same, in the first case it is not guaranteed that the time-scale of the secret message and 
the host signal is the same. In a similar way, if the quantization of the secret message is 
6-bits, HC remains in 100% even if the total number of replaced bits has increased.  For 
this reason, in the specific case of speech-in-speech hiding it is suggested to take into 
account both kinds of measurements. 
c) Robustness: it is related to the ability of the stego signal to preserve the secret 
message even if signal manipulations are applied, such as filtering, lossy compression, 
re-quantization and re-sampling.  
“A system is called robust if the embedded information cannot be 
altered without making drastic changes to the stego signal”. [1] 
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Since there is a compromise among the above features, they cannot be optimized 
at the same time, and therefore if one of them is optimized a reasonable deterioration is 
obtained in at least one of the others [5].  It is known as the magic triangle.  
 
Figure 2.2. The magic triangle of data hiding. Based on [5]. 
Every feature is related to one method of data hiding.  For example, while in 
digital watermarking the most important feature is the robustness, in the case of secure 
steganography is the transparency. Nevertheless, all the features should be satisfied in 
any data hiding system. 
2.1.2. Cryptography 
In a similar way as for steganography, some definitions of cryptography are 
presented, as follows: 
“An encryption scheme or cryptosystem is a tuple (P, C, K, ε, D) with 
the following properties: (i) P  is a set. It is called the plaintext space. Its 
elements are called plaintexts. (ii) C is a set. It is called the ciphertext space. 
Its elements are called ciphertexts. (iii) K is a set. It is called the key space.  
Its elements are called keys. (iv) ε ={Ek  : k  E  K} is a family of functions Ek  : 
P  → C.  Its elements are called encryption functions. (v) D =  {Dk  : k E  K} is a 
family of functions Dk  : C → P. Its elements are called decryption functions. 
(vi) For each e  ∈  K,  there is d ∈  K  such that Dd(Ee(p))  =  p  for  all p ∈ P”. 
[6] 
“Cryptography is the study of methods of sending messages in 
disguised form so that only the intended recipients can remove the disguise 
and read the message.  The message we want to send is called the plaintext 
and the disguised message is called the ciphertext.  The plaintext and 
ciphertext are written in some alphabet consisting of a certain number N of 
letters.  The term "letter"  (or "character") can refer not only to the familiar 
A-Z, but also to numerals, blanks, punctuation marks, or any other  symbols  
that  we  allow  ourselves  to  use  when  writing  the  messages.   The 
process of converting a plaintext to a ciphertext is called enciphering or 
encryption, and the reverse process is called deciphering”. [7] 
According to the above definitions, the encryption system has three agents: the 
plain-text, the cipher-text and the key. Unlike steganography, the plain-text is not 
hidden, instead of that it is “mapped” according to the key. It is illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3. Global scheme of symmetric cryptography 
2.1.3. Comparison between steganography and cryptography 
Summarizing, while cryptography tries to conceal the plain-text of the secret 
message, the purpose of steganography is to try to conceal the existence of the secret 
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message. Both methods use a secret key in the embedding/encryption and 
extraction/decryption processes, however there are important differences between 
them which are illustrated in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Steganography & encryption 
Method Inputs Output Process 
Steganography Secret message; cover 
signal; key 
Stego signal Hiding 
Cryptography Plain-text; key 
 
Cipher-text Mapping 
In the case of speech encryption, both the plain-text and the cipher-text are 
speech signals, while in the case of speech steganography, both the secret 
message, the cover (or host) signal and the stego signal are speech signals. It is 
worth noting that in the classical approach of speech encryption, a second signal 











This section presents the definition of security in both steganographic and 
cryptographic systems. 
2.2.1. Secure Steganography 
A steganographic system is secure if the following four requirements are 
satisfied: 
“(i) Messages are hidden using a public algorithm and a secret key; 
the secret key must identify the sender uniquely; (ii) Only a holder of the 
correct key can detect, extract, and prove the existence of the hidden 
message. Nobody else should be able to find any statistical evidence of a 
message's existence; (iii) Even if the enemy knows (or is able to select) the 
contents of one hidden message, he should have no chance of detecting 
others; (iv) It is computationally infeasible to detect hidden messages”. [1] 
In other words, a secure steganography system must have the following 
characteristics: 
a) The stego signal must be statistically transparent. It guarantees that the 
enemy does not detect the presence of the secret message. 
b) Key-generator must create a different key every time. It means that the key-
space is long enough with the purpose to increase the effort to discover them. 
c) The secret message is recovered by a unique key.  It guarantees that if the 





2.2.2. Secure Cryptography 
A cryptographic system is secure if the following conditions are satisfied: 
“Let |C|  = |K|    and Pr(p)  >  0 for any plaintext p. Our cryptosystem 
has perfect secrecy if and only if the probability distribution on the key 
space is the uniform distribution and if for any plaintext p and any 
ciphertext c there is exactly one key k  with Ek(p) = c. Therefore, for each 
ciphertext c there is exactly one key k with Ek(p) = c”. [8] 
In relation to the strength of the system, the authors of [9] present the 
following idea: 
“The strength of crypto is based not on the secrecy of the algorithm, 
but on the secrecy of the key”. [9] 
According to the above statements, it is clear that the most important aspect of a 
crypto-system is the key.  In the first definition of security, it was presented that all keys 
must have the same probability and only one key must be used to map the plain-text to 
the cipher-text and vice versa. In other words, if there are N plain-texts and N cipher-
texts, the total number of keys is exactly equal to N. Therefore, if a wrong key is used to 
decipher the encrypted message, a wrong plain-text must be obtained. 
Summarizing, in both steganography and cryptography the key-space plays an 
important role in the security of the system. In both cases every pair of secret-message 
& stego signal or plain-text & cipher-text must have only one key and therefore if a 
wrong key is used (in the extraction or deciphering process), a wrong recovered secret 
message will be obtained.  
2.3. Steganalysis and cryptanalysis 
Steganalysis is the process of discovering the existence of secret messages while 
the purpose of cryptanalysis is to reveal the secret message.  
Some definitions are presented, as follows: 
“Steganalysis is the set of techniques that aim to distinguish between 
cover-signals and stego-signals. A passive warden simply examines the 
signal and tries to determine if it potentially contains a hidden message. If 
it appears that it does, then the signal is stopped; otherwise, it will go 
through. An active warden, on the other hand, can alter signals 
intentionally, even though there may not be any trace of a hidden message, 
in order to foil any secret communication that nevertheless can be 
occurring”. [10] 
“Cryptanalysis: 1) the steps, operations, and processes performed to 
convert encrypted text into plain text without knowledge of the key 
employed in the encryption. 2) The study of encrypted texts. 3) An analysis 
of a cryptosystem to obtain sensitive information legally or clandestinely 
when applicable key is not available. Note: Cryptanalysis is usually 
performed with the aid of computer hardware and software”. [11] 
Some of these techniques are presented in the following subsections. 
2.3.1. Techniques for Steganalysis 
The techniques of steganalysis are related to the nature of the stego-object; for 
example, techniques for stego-image detection are different from techniques for 
speech-stego detection. In the first case the characteristics of the Human Visual System 
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(HVS) are taken into account, while in the second one the Human Auditory System 
(HAS). 
Although there is a wide variety of techniques to identify image-stego signals 
there are not too many techniques able to identify speech-stego signals. However, in 
the recent years some techniques have been proposed.  Most of them are based on the 
statistical features of the speech signals -in time domain, frequency domain of time-
frequency domain- and these features are the input of the classifier. 
Steganalysis of speech signals in time domain: this kind of technique uses the 
statistics of the speech signal, in time domain, to identify the stego signals. In [12], the 
logarithm of the speech signal is applied before of calculating its statistics.   In [13], the 
amplitude co-occurrence matrix is used as input for the classification system. The 
authors found that the detection rate is better in the logarithmic version of the speech 
signals instead of the original speech signal. 
Steganalysis in frequency domain: the statistics of the spectrum of the speech 
signal are taken into account. The spectrum of the 2nd to 4th order derivate of the speech 
signal is affected when data have been embedded and this is more appreciable in 
higher frequencies [14], [15]. Then, it is expected that the statistics of stego signals are 
significantly different to the statistics of cover signals, and therefore the stego signal 
can be identified. Other authors use the cepstrum of the speech signal (instead of its 
spectrum) to identify stego signals [16]. 
Steganalysis in time-frequency domain: the statistics of the wavelet 
coefficients of the speech signal are used as features for the classifier [17].  
Other type of technique uses some metrics of the speech signal (e.g. signal to 
noise ratio and Log-likelihood ratio [18] or fraction of false neighbors [19]) as features 
to detect the stego signal. 
2.3.2. Techniques for Cryptanalysis 
Since the purpose of cryptanalysis is to reveal the plain-text without the 
knowledge of the key, the techniques are classified according to the information that 
the attacker knows. The following cases are explained for the permutation-based 
speech scramblers.  
Know plain-text attack: in this case, both a plain-text and a cipher-text are 
known by the attacker. The highest amplitude of the plain-text and the highest 
amplitude of the cipher-text are found and then the relative places among them gives 
one value of the key.  The process continues with the rest of data (samples or spectral 
coefficients) and then all the relative positions give the entire key [20]. With the key, a 
new cipher-text is deciphered and then the corresponding plain-text is obtained. 
Cipher-text only attack on a fixed permutation system:  since in a real world 
the plain-text is not known by the attacker, the process consists on revealing the key 
according to a criterion of optimization based on the envelope of the spectrum. It works 
with a smooth spectrum as the reference spectrum and then the objective is to relocate 
the spectral components of the cipher signal to minimize the error between the spectra 
[21]. In this attack it is not necessary to relocate all data in right places, only a sufficient 
number to recover intelligible speech [20]. 
Cipher-text only attack on a varying permutation system: when the system 
uses different keys, the problem to decipher the plain-text without the knowledge of 
the key requires a higher effort. However, the complexity can be reduced if only the 
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bandwidth of 300 to 500 Hz is used in the attack.  In this range the speech signal is still 
intelligible and the advantage is that the total number of coefficients to relocate is 
significantly lower than in the entire spectrum. Once the spectrum has been separated 
into blocks, the process is the same as in the previous attack [20], [21] . 
When the key does not map the plain-text to the cipher-text in a relation of one to 
one, for example in the case of codeword permutations, the plain-text can be 
deciphered if the number of blocks is small enough.  The relocation process is carried 
out by an optimization criterion (e.g. cepstral distance) and the use of neural networks 


















2.4. Methods of Speech Steganography: Theory 
This section explains some of the most important methods of steganography on 
speech signals. It encompasses LSB substitution, Frequency Masking, Shift Spectrum 
Algorithm, Spread Spectrum and Tone Insertion.  
2.4.1. Least Significant Bit (LSB) substitution 
One of the most popular schemes in steganography is LSB substitution because it 
is a very simple and general method to hide data. It has been used in images, video and 
audio. The objective is to replace some of the LSBs of the hosts signal with the bits of 
the secret message.  
 
Figure 2.4. Illustration of the LSB substitution method. 
Figure 2.4 shows an example of the LSB substitution method in which the host 
signal is 8-bits, secret message is 4-bits, and the 4-LSBs of the host signal are replaced 
with the secret message. Secret message can be e.g. the ASCII representation of 
characters, the binary representation of a speech signal or the representation of a 
binary image. 
This method can be carried out in time domain (samples), frequency domain (e.g. 




The trade-off among transparency, hiding capacity and robustness is easily 
analyzed in this technique. If the total number of replaced bits by sample (or 
coefficient) increases, HC increases and transparency decreases.  But if only 1-LSB is 
replaced, transparency increases and HC decreases. The robustness depends on the 
position of the replaced bit (or bits). For example if the host sample is 10110011b and 
the fifth-LSB-place is modified with ‘0’, the stego sample is 10100011b; but if the first-
LSB-place is modified (with ‘0’) the stego sample is 10110010b. Although in both cases 
HC=1bit/sample, the robustness of the first case is better than in the second case, or in 
other words, the stego signal of the first case can tolerate signal manipulations (that 
slightly modify the value of the sample) while the second cannot. On the other hand, the 
transparency of the second case is better than in the first case. Since in steganography 
the most important feature is the transparency, the total number of replaced bits varies 
according to the desirable transparency. Some works have revealed that the 
transparency in wavelet domain is higher than in time domain for the same number of 
replaced LSBs [23], [24].  
In the case of speech-in-speech hiding the host signal and secret message are 
speech signals. It is a common practice to attenuate the secret message in order to 
decrease its number of bits, and therefore, e.g. a secret message of 8-bits is hidden into 
a host signal of 16-bits. In this case HC is 100% in terms of the time scale (since both 
signals have the same time-scale) or HC is 8-bits/sample (or 50% of the total number of 
bits). 
2.4.2. Frequency Masking (FM) 
This method takes advantage of the masking property of the HAS in which one 
sound may be masked by another if one produces high levels while the other remains 
faint [25]. A high enough threshold between the level of the high sound and the level of 
the faint sound produces a masking phenomenon and the faint sound would not be 
perceptible.  
The dynamic range of the secret message must be four times lower than the 
dynamic range of the host signal (attenuation is applied if needed). Then, both signals 
are transformed to frequency domain (e.g. Fast Fourier Transform –FFT-). Once the 
secret’s coefficients and the host’s coefficients have been obtained, a search algorithm 
is used, as follows: 
i) The first secret’s coefficient is compared to every one of the host’s 
coefficients and it stops when the masking criteria is satisfied, i.e., when the 
amplitude of the host’s coefficient is at least 4-times higher than the 
amplitude of the secret’s coefficient. 
ii) The secret’s coefficient is hidden into the LSBs of the “selected” host’s 
coefficient.  The output is the stego’s coefficient.  
iii) Steps (i) and (ii) are repeated until the last secret’s coefficient has been 
compared to at least one host’s coefficient.  
Finally, the stego’s coefficients are transformed to time domain (e.g. IFFT) and 
the stego signal is obtained. 
The search procedure is illustrated with an example. Suppose that the host’s 
coefficients are = [5 12 8 16 10 12 17 12] and the secret’s coefficients are = [2 1 2 3 4 3 
3 4], then the first secret’s coefficient (2) is compared to the first host’s coefficient (5) 
and the searching process continues because the masking criterion is not satisfied 
(since 5<2*4). Then, 2 is compared to 12 (the second host’s coefficient) and this is 
selected because the masking criterion is satisfied (since 12≥2*4). The process is 
repeated until the eighth secret’s coefficient (4) is compared to at least one of the host’s 
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coefficients. In some cases, for the last places of the secret’s coefficients it is not 
possible to find a host’s coefficient that satisfies the masking criterion and then this 
technique does not guarantee that all of the secret’s coefficients will be hidden (unlike 
the LSB technique). Therefore, HC in FM is equal or lower than in the LSB scheme. 
2.4.3. Shift Spectrum Algorithm (SSA) 
This technique is used in the frequency domain (or time-frequency domain) of 
the host signal and the secret message.  The spectrum of the secret message is shifted 
to the highest subband of the spectrum of the host signal [26]. The perceptual 
transparency is based on the fact that the HAS is less sensible to the highest 
frequencies; therefore, the secret message can be hidden without suspicion of its 
existence. For example, if the secret message has a bandwidth of 4K Hz and the host 
signal has a bandwidth of 20K Hz, the range of 16-20K Hz of the host signal can be 
replaced with the secret message. It is possible to take two options:  the spectrums of 
the signals are overlapped or the LSBs of the host’s spectrum are replaced with the bits 
of the secret’s spectrum. 
Although the HC of SSA is lower than in the cases of LSB and FM, the 
transparency is better because only one portion of the host’s signal has been modified 
and it represents the less sensible range of the HAS. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the SSA method in which the spectrum of the secret 
message is lower than the spectrum of the host signal and therefore the high 






Figure 2.5.  Shift Spectrum Principle. [56]. 
2.4.4. Spread Spectrum (SS) 
In the classical approach, the secret message is spread out by a constant called 
the chip rate and then modulated with a pseudorandom signal [27]. The disadvantage 
is that the computational cost for implementing the scheme is high. A solution consists 
on spreading the secret’s spectrum along host’s spectrum [26].  Because the bandwidth 
of the host signal is higher, the number of spectral coefficients is higher too; therefore, 
the secret’s coefficients are relocated in interspersed positions of the host’s spectrum.  
 
Figure 2.6.  Spread Spectrum Principle. [56]. 
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Figure 2.5 illustrates the principle proposed by the authors of [26]. In the current 
example, every four coefficients of the host’s spectrum are replaced with one coefficient 
of the secret’s spectrum. 
Like SSA, the HC of SS is lower than the obtained from LSB or FM. Since the low 
frequencies of the host signal are modified, it is expected that the transparency is lower 
than in SSA. 
2.4.5. Tone Insertion 
In takes advantage in an indirect form of the masking property of the HAS. Two 
tones at frequencies f0 and f1 are used for embedding one bit. The value of the bit (‘0’ or 
‘1’) depends of the ratio of the power between the tones [28], [29].  For example, if the 
power of f1 is 0.1% of the power of f0, then a bit with value of ‘0’ will be embedded. 
Similarly, if the power of f0 is 0.1% of the power of f1, then a bit with value of ‘1’ will be 
embedded. This process is repeated in small non-overlapped frames. The advantage of 
this method is that the stego signal is robust against signal manipulations, but the 









2.5. Survey of Speech Steganography 
This section presents the state of the art of speech steganography and the 
comparison among the schemes found in literature. 
Tone Insertion: the scheme proposed by Gopalan uses two frequencies to insert 
one bit according to the ratio between the powers of the frequencies. It is carried out in 
the frequency domain [30] or in the cepstral domain [31], [32]. In both cases, the HC is 
lower than 256 bits into a signal of 256.000 bits. 
LSB substitution:  Cvejic and Sepanem used the wavelet domain to embed bits. 
They found that the highest number of replaced bits without significant degradation of 
the quality of the signal is 8-LSBs. In this case, the HC is up to 352.800 bits into a signal 
of 705.600 bits [33]. The transparency and robustness depend on the number of 
replaced bits, the higher the number the lower the transparency but the higher the 
robustness. However, since 8-bits only represent the ∼0.4% of the amplitude of the 
signal, the stego signal is not robust enough against signal manipulations. Shirali and 
Manzuri proposed a scheme in which the number of LSBs depends on the amplitude of 
the wavelet coefficient. The higher the amplitude, the higher is the number of replaced 
LSBs. With the purpose of increasing the transparency of the signal, the silent regions 
are not used to embed data. In average, the highest HC is 3 bits per coefficient [34]. 
Frequency masking (FM): in the proposal of Djebbar et al, the speech signal is 
divided in frames of 4ms and its spectrum is calculated [35]. The secret message is 
hidden in the first 28 coefficients (of the 64 by frame). Since FM depends on the 
masking criterion, the HC is not fixed and depends on the host signal.  The HC is up to 
14300 bits into a signal of 256000 bits. With the purpose of increasing the robustness 
of the stego signal, they modified the scheme and the bits are not replaced from the 1-
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LSB, the first position is selected.  If the first replaced bit begins in the 4-LSB position, 
the hiding capacity significantly decreases (HC∼3kbps) [36]. 
Shift Spectrum Algorithm (SSA): Djebbar et al proposed a scheme in which the 
secret message is embedded in the 8-LSBs of the coefficients of the host signal in the 
range of 7K Hz to 8K Hz [37].  Since the HAS is low sensible in the selected range, the 
perceptual transparency of the stego signal is high, nevertheless, the secret message is 
lost if the stego signals is filtered with a high-pass filter. The HC is up to 8000 bits into a 
signal of 256000 bits. Rabie and Guerchi proposed a speech-in-speech hiding scheme 
based on SSA and Code-Excited Linear Prediction (CELP) [38]. The 32-CELP parameters 
of the secret message are hidden into the high frequency of the host signal (the last 32 
coefficients of the 80 coefficients by frame). Like the scheme of [37], the weakness is 
that the information related to the secret message is lost if the stego signal is filtered 
with a high pass filter. Finally, the scheme proposed by Dimitry et al shifts the spectrum 
of the voice signal to the range of 18-22 K Hz of the host signal. The stego signal has the 
spectrum of the host signal up to 18 KHz and the spectrum of the secret message from 
18 KHz to 22 KHz. The hiding capacity is 4 of every 22 spectral coefficients [39]. 
Spread Spectrum (SS): in [39] is proposed a scheme of SS in which an attenuated 
speech signal is hidden into an audio signal. The spectral coefficients of the attenuated 
secret message are interlaced with the spectral coefficients of the host signal every n 
places. According to their results, the stego signal resists MP3 compression with a bit 
rate of 320 kbps but does not with bit rate of 256 kbps. If 8-LSBs are replaced every 
four spectral coefficients, the ratio of the capacity is 8 of every 64 bits. 
The comparison among transparency, hiding capacity and robustness of the 
above techniques is shown in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2. Performance of the speech hiding schemes. 
Method Scheme Transparency Hiding 
Capacity 
Robustness 
Tone Insertion [30-32] High HC < 0.1% High 
LSB  [33] Middle to high HC ≤ 50% Middle to low 
[34] High HC < 20% Middle 
FM [35] High HC < 6% Middle to high 
[36] High HC < 1.5% High 
SSA [37] High HC < 4% Low 
[38] High HC ≤ 40% Low 
[39] High HC ≤ 20% Low 
SS [39] High HC ≤ 12.5% Middle to low 
 
According to the results shown in Table 2.2, it is worth noting that when the HC 
increases, the transparency or/and the robustness decreases. The best scheme in terms 
of HC is the worst scheme in terms of transparency and the best scheme in terms of 
robustness is the worst scheme in terms of HC. Until now, none of the known schemes 
has a good enough trade-off among transparency, hiding capacity and robustness. Since 
the speech signal has a higher number of bits than a plain-text, HC plays an important 














2.6. Permutation-based speech scrambling systems: theory 
This section explains some of the most important methods of speech scrambling. 
Although the methods are divided in permutation-based and amplitude scrambling, 
only the permutation-based schemes are explained because the proposed design 
(presented in Chapter 4) is a special case of permutation-based speech scrambling. It 
encompasses: Time-Segment Permutation (TSP), Frequency-Domain Scrambling (FDS) 
and Time-Frequency Scrambling (TFS).  Everyone is briefly explained in the following 
subsections. 
2.6.1. Time-Segment Permutation 
TSP is one of the oldest and simplest techniques of speech scrambling. The 
speech signal is divided in small blocks (typically 16 to 32 ms) and then the samples are 
relocated according to a key. Without loss of generality, there are M blocks each one 
with L samples. The samples are permuted into the block and each block can have (or 
not) a different key. 
The weaknesses of this method are listed as follows: 
a) The residual intelligibility is not low enough: it depends on the size of the 
key.  
b) The key space is not long enough:  e.g. a block with L samples has up to L! 
combinations, but only a small percentage (∼0.1% [40]) is usable. For 
example, a key related to single delay or inversion is not usable.  
c) The bandwidth of the scrambled speech signal can be higher than of the 
original speech signal. 
d) A trained listener can discover the original speech signal. 
Figure 2.7 illustrates an example of TSP scheme in which the place within the 
block is permuted. 
 
Figure 2.7. Example of TSP-based speech scrambling 
In the above example every block has twelve samples which are relocated 
according to a key and then the number of possible combinations by block is 12! 
2.6.2. Frequency-Domain Scrambling 
Unlike the TSP scheme, the permutation process is carried out in the frequency 
domain. The speech signal is separated in subbands and then the sub-bands are 
permuted (it is known as band-splitting). The higher the number of subbands, the 
higher is the number of possible combinations. If there are P subbands, the total 
number of possible combinations is P! Figure 2.8 illustrates an example of the scheme 
of FDS. 
 
Figure 2.8. Example of FDS-based speech scrambling 
The advantages of FSD are: 
a) The bandwidth of the speech signal is preserved. 
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b) If band-splitting is combined with inversion, the total number of possible 
combinations increases up to P!2P. It is worth noting that unlike TSP, in FDS 
the inversion is a usable permutation and then the percentage of effective 
keys can increase (e.g. up to 5% [40]). 
Despite the residual intelligibility is better than in TSP it is not low enough. 
2.6.3. Time-Frequency Scrambling 
This technique combines TSP and FDS.  The speech signal is split in P subbands 
and every subband is divided in M blocks of length L. The permutation process is made 
inter blocks and inter coefficients. The total number of possible combinations by 
subband is L!*M! and therefore the higher the values of M and L, the lower is the 
residual intelligibility. However, since M and L are small numbers, the key-space is not 
long enough. Despite of this, TFS overcomes the problem of residual intelligibility of its 
predecessors, and like FDS, it preserves the bandwidth of the speech signal [41]. 
 
Figure 2.9. Example of TFS-based speech scrambling 
Figure 2.9 illustrates an example of TFS in wavelet domain. The permutation 
process is carried out inter blocks of the same sub-band according to a key. It is worth 
noting that the amplitude of the coefficients is not “destroyed”, but in fact the plaint-
text of the speech signal is.  In the current example, the total number of subbands is 2 
and the number of coefficients per subband is 12.  Therefore, the total number of 












2.7. Survey of permutation-based speech scrambling 
The purpose of this section is to give a survey about the schemes of speech 
scrambling.  At the end, they are compared in order to illustrate the strengths and 
weaknesses.   
Time Segment Permutation, TSP: one of the oldest works of speech scrambling 
is the on developed by Philips, Lee and Thomas [42]. They analyzed the relationship 
between the highest level of displacement of the samples and the residual intelligibility 
of the signal.  They found that if the samples are placed in reverse order, the residual 
intelligibility is high; it means that the secret message can be revealed. However, if the 
samples are placed in positions close to the original ones, the residual intelligibility is 
high, too, and therefore the best case is an intermediate value. If the size of the frame is 
15 (N=15), the proposed level of normalized displacement is 0.5. 
Frequency Domain Scrambling, FDS: Matsunaga et al proposed a scheme in 
which the speech signal is compressed and then it is transformed to frequency domain 
by using the FFT [43]. Once the spectral coefficients have been obtained, they are 
permuted and a dummy spectrum is added; finally the IFFT is calculated. This process 
is carried out in frames of 32 ms and the number of coefficients to be permutated is 83. 
The descrambled speech signal is similar to the original speech one. Woo and Leung 
used the 256 spectral coefficients to scramble a speech signal with all the coefficients 
placed in different position than their original ones (derangement) [44]. They found 
that the residual intelligibility is very low.  
TFS and FDS: the scheme proposed by Mosa, Messiha and Zahran uses chaotic 
maps for permuting the speech signal in time domain [45]. The chaotic keys have a size 
up to several thousands and therefore the effort to discover them is very high.  
Together with that, once the samples have been permutated, the output is divided in 
small blocks and their spectrums are relocated.  It guarantees that the residual 
intelligibility is very low. According to their results, the secret message is recovered 
even if additive noise is mixed to the scrambled speech signal.  
Time-Frequency Scrambling, TFS: the scheme proposed by Fulong, Jun and 
Yumin uses the multi-level Wavelet Transform to scramble the speech signal [46].  The 
speech signal is transformed to time-frequency domain by the DWT and then the 
wavelet subbands are permuted. The reconstruction of the permuted sub-bands is the 
scrambled speech signal. In a similar way, Sadkhan, Abdulmuhsen, Al-Tahan proposed 
a scheme in which the speech signal is scrambled in wavelet domain [47].  In this case, 
the speech signal is divided in blocks of 16ms and its wavelet coefficients are permuted 
(128 coefficients by frame). Then, the blocks of the permuted wavelet coefficients are 
concatenated and the inverse wavelet transform is applied. According to their results, 
the recovered speech signal is legible even if the scrambled speech signal has been 
manipulated with additive noise. 
The above proposals are compared in terms of residual intelligibility, quality of 
the descrambled speech signal (recovered secret message) and robustness against 
signal manipulations. The comparison is shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3. Performance of the speech scrambling schemes. 






TSP [42] Key-space = 15! Middle Low 
FDS [43] Key-space = 83! Middle Low 
 [44] Key-space = 256! Low Middle 
TSP + FDS [45] Key-space1 ≥ 1000! 
Key-space2 is NP* 
Very low High 
TFS [47] Key-space = 128! Low Middle 
*NP = not provided 
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According to the results, the best scenario is the proposed by the authors of [45] 
because they used a long key.  It is worth noting that the chaotic key generator can be a 
better solution than the classical pseudo-noise generator of the rest of the approaches. 
However, it is expected that the residual intelligibility of TFS is better than the obtained 























According to the state of the art of speech steganography and speech scrambling 
schemes, the following ideas summarize the chapter: 
a) The main difference between a stego signal and a scrambled signal is 
that the first one seems to contain non-sensitive information, and the 
second one looks like a manipulated signal. Therefore, an attacker 
employs his effort in trying to reveal the secret message of the 
scrambled signal but does not in the stego signal. By using traditional 
approaches, if the transparency of the stego signal is high enough, it can 
be a more secure way to transmit speech signals. 
b) The most important feature in a steganography system is the 
transparency followed by the hiding capacity and the robustness. In the 
specific case of speech-in-speech hiding, the HC is significantly higher 
than in the case of text-in-speech hiding. Although the robustness is not 
the most important feature in the design, it is desirable that the stego 
signal can resist signal manipulations like lossy compression, filtering, 
re-quantization and additive noise.  
c) In the proposals found in literature for speech hiding, most of them 
satisfy one or two of the features, but none of them has a good enough 
trade-off among transparency, hiding capacity and robustness. 
d) In the case of speech scrambling, the most important aspects to take into 
account are the residual intelligibility of the speech signal and the size of 
the key. The lower the residual intelligibility and the higher the size of 
the key, the better is the scrambling scheme. 
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e) The schemes based on TFS have a lower residual intelligibility than that 
obtained in TSP or FDS because both the places and frequency of the 
sounds are modified. 
f) Although most of the classical approaches use a PN sequence to relocate 
the samples or coefficients, it is not an efficient key generator because 
the length of the key is not long enough. Alternative solutions can be 























3. Ability of adaptation of Speech 
Signals 
 
The hypothesis of adaptation of speech signals is presented in this chapter. This 
mechanism is the core of the two proposals: a permutation-based speech 















In the subject of digital speech processing, many techniques have been proposed 
with the aim to enhance the quality of the signal (e.g. [48]-[50]), to detect and stand out 
characteristics (e.g. [51]-[53]) and to classify sounds (e.g. [54]-[55]), among others. 
These techniques can be used in time domain, frequency domain or time-frequency 
domain. A speech signal can be manipulated so that it sounds with different tone and 
for example, a voice signal from a female-adult speaker can be transformed so that it 
sounds like a voice signal from a female-child speaker. But until now, it has never been 
proposed a technique able to modify the plain-text (and gender, rhythm and language) 
of the speech signal so that it resembles a target speech signal. This concept is the core 
of the current thesis and it is known as the ability of adaptation of speech signals. 
This chapter is divided in three parts.  In the first one, the idea behind the ability 
of adaptation of speech signals is explained.  The relationship between different speech 
signals is analyzed in terms of their histogram and kurtosis. In the second one, the 
hypothesis of adaptation of speech signals is introduced and the conditions under 
which the hypothesis is true. A deterministic method to adapt an original speech signal 
to a target speech signal is also explained in the second part. Finally, the hypothesis of 
adaptation is validated in two ways: firstly in terms of the type of sounds (vowels and 






3.2. Histogram-based analysis of speech signals 
Speech signals can be considered as a signature of its owner because both the 
rhythm and tone are special characteristics that vary among people. For example, if the 
same plain-text is pronounced by two people, the time representation of their voices 
can be similar but their frequency representations are not. It is true even if the gender 
(and age) of the speaker is the same. Additionally, if the plain-text is modified, both the 
time and frequency representations of the speech signals will be completely different.   
It can be easily illustrated with an example. Suppose there are two speech signals 
with different plaint-text, for example speech1 with the plain-text “good morning 
everybody” and speech2 with the plain-text “see you the next week”.  Both signals are 










Figure 3.1. Time domain: a) speech1; b) speech2.  Frequency domain: c) speech1; 
d) speech2 
As it is expected, both time and frequency representations are different in each 
case. If the signals are represented in time-frequency domain by using the Discrete 




























Wavelet Transform, their wavelet coefficients are different, too.  Figure 3.2 shows the 






Figure 3.2. Wavelet coefficients: a) speech1; b) speeech2 
Now, two non-zero arrays are made from the non-zero wavelet coefficients of 
speech1 and speech2.  Since there are a lot coefficients with magnitude close to zero, a 
threshold is set, th, which classifies the zero or the non-zero wavelet coefficients. If the 
magnitude of the wavelet coefficient is lower than th, then the thresholded coefficient is 
set to zero, but if this is higher than (or equal to) th, the amplitude of the coefficient is 
preserved. Once the two non-zero arrays have been obtained, their histograms are 
calculated. Figure 3.3 shows the histograms of the non-zero wavelet coefficients of the 







Figure 3.3. Histogram of the non-zero wavelet coefficients: a) from speech1 signal; 
b) from speech2 signal. 
























According to Figure 3.3, it is noticed that the histograms have similar shape. Since 
the kurtosis reflects the shape of a distribution, it is expected that the kurtosis of the 


















      (3.1) 
Where µ is the mean, σ2 is the variance,  k is the kurtosis, N is the total number of 
elements and w is the 1D-array of the non-zero wavelet coefficients of the speech 
signal. 
In the current example, the kurtosis from the signals is 5.5 for speech1 and 4.6 for 
speech2.  Since a similar shape of the histograms is related to a similar density of data, 
similar value of kurtosis means that the density distribution of the wavelet coefficients 
is similar, too. In other words, although speech1 and speech2 sound different, the 
density distributions of their non-zero wavelet coefficients are similar. Therefore if the 
wavelet coefficients of speech2 are relocated so that they resemble the wavelet 
coefficients of speech1, the adapted speech signal may sound similar to speech1. This is 
the idea behind the ability of adaptation of speech signals.  
In this context, speech2 may sound similar to speech1 (and vice versa) because 
their kurtosis (of the non-zero wavelet coefficients) is similar. Then, the adaptation is 
feasible if and only if the kurtosis and the number of the non-zero wavelet coefficients 
are similar between the speech signals. The hypothesis of adaptation is presented in 





3.3. Hypothesis formulation and statements 
This section proposes and explains the concept of adaptation based on a 
relocation process in wavelet domain.  The hypothesis of adaptation is formulated as 
follows: 
any speech signal may seem similar to a target speech signal if its wavelet 
coefficients are sorted [56],[57] 
In the above hypothesis: 
(i) The term “any” speech signal corresponds to legible voice signals. It 
discards silence signals and highly noisy speech signals (SNRmin should be 
20 dB). 
(ii) The term “may” implies that the adaptation is feasible. 
(iii) The term “similar” means that the Squared Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
(SPCC) of the target speech signal and the adapted secret signal is close to 
1. In other words, the sound of the adapted speech signal is perceptually 
identical to the sound of the target speech signal. 
The Squared Pearson Correlation Coefficient, ρ2, is obtained as follows: 
( )
( )( ) ( )( )












































ρ   (3.2) 
Where S, Ŝ, Smean and Ŝmean are the original, extracted secret signal, 
mean of original and mean of extracted secret signal, respectively. 
(iv) The term “sort” is related to a relocation process. 
The hypothesis is true if the speech signal and the target speech signal satisfy the 
following conditions: 
a) The same sampling frequency. 
b) The same time-frame. 
c) The same wavelet base in the decomposition and reconstruction stages. 
d) The ratio of the (number of the) non-zero wavelet coefficient between the 
signals is close to 1.  







ratio =      (3.3) 
Where non_zero(w) is the total number of the non_zero wavelet 
coefficients of the speech signal, { }21, ww  are the wavelet coefficients of 
speech1 and speech2, respectively. 
A frame is considered as a segment of the speech signal with a quasi-constant 
dynamic range and SNR. For example, if a speech signal contains whisper sounds and 
screaming voice signals, the signal must be separated in non-overlapped segments of 
whisper sounds and screaming sounds.  The same process is applied if the SNR 
abruptly changes into the signal. On the other hand, a coefficient is classified as non-
zero if its magnitude is higher than a threshold (e.g. 1% of the highest amplitude). 
The hypothesis is theoretically supported by the following development. Suppose 
there are two speech signals: one (discrete) speech signal, s[n], and one (discrete) 
target speech signal, tg[n]. Figure3.4 illustrates the speech signal and Figure 3.5 shows 
the target speech signal. 
Every signal has m samples located in an integer place of the discrete time and 
















Figure 3.5. Target speech signal, tg[n]: a) entire time-scale; b) zoom of the speech 
signal 
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  (3.4) 
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  (3.5) 
with 
[ ] [ ]ntgns ≠         (3.6) 
Where n is the discrete time, [ ]0n-nδ  is the delayed impulse at n=n0 and 
{ }
00
, nn ba  are the amplitudes of the impulses of the speech signal and target speech 
signal, respectively. These signals are perceptually different if ai and bi are not 
correlated. 
The signals are represented on time-frequency domain by the DWT, according to 
e.q. (3.5) and (3.6): 
[ ] ( )kSns DWT →    Ζ∈k    (3.7) 
[ ] ( )kTgtg DWT →n        (3.8) 
Where ( ) ( ){ }kTgkS ,  are the wavelet representations of the speech signal and 
the target speech signal, respectively, and k is the time-frequency axis. The wavelet 
coefficients includes coarse and detail coefficients, as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }kdkckS ss≡        (3.9) 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }kdkckTg tgtg≡       (3.10) 
In the above equations ( ) ( ){ }kdkc ss ,  and ( ) ( ){ }kdkc tgtg ,  are coarse and detail 
coefficients of the speech signal and the target speech signal, respectively.  
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In a similar way to equations (3.4) and (3.5), the wavelet coefficients can be 
modeled as the sum of delayed impulses in the time-frequency domain, according to: 
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Where { }
00
21 , kk gg are coarse-weights and detail-weights of the wavelet 
coefficients of the speech signal, and { }
00
21 , kk pp  are coarse-weights and detail-
weights of the wavelet coefficients of the target speech signal. The value of M 
corresponds to the total number of detail (or coarse) coefficients of every signal and it 
is related to the number of samples m and the order of the filters of the DWT.  
If the speech signal and the target speech signal are perceptually different, their 
coarse-weights and detail-weights will be different, too. In other words: 
[ ] [ ] ( ) ( ) { }
0000
2211 kkkk
ggpgkTgkSntgnsif ≠∨≠∴≠⇒≠ (3.15) 
Then, only if a sorting (relocation) process is applied, the speech signal would be 
perceptually identical to the target speech signal. If the coarse-weights and detail-
weights of the speech signal are relocated so that they resemble the coarse-weights and 
detail-weights of the target speech signal, the adapted speech signal would sound like 
the target speech signal. Then, the hypothesis is true if the wavelet representation of 
the adapted speech signal, ( )kSa , is highly correlated to the wavelet representation of 
the target speech signal, ( )kTg , according to: 
if   
( ) ( )( ) [ ] [ ]ntgnskTgkS aa ≈⇒≈1,2ρ     (3.16) 
with 
( ) [ ]nskS aIDWTa  →       (3.17) 
In the above equations, ρ2 is the index of similarity, IDWT is the Inverse Discrete 
Wavelet Transform and [ ]nsa  is the adapted speech signal, in time domain. At this 
point, the purpose is to find a wavelet representation of the adapted speech signal 
which satisfies eq. (3.16). There are at least two ways to find the adapted speech signal: 
by a deterministic and by a heuristic search. In this thesis a deterministic search is 
proposed. 
To find an adapted speech signals that it resembles the target speech signal, the 
following steps should be carried out: 
(i) The speech signal and the target speech signal are decomposed using the 
DWT with the same wavelet base, according to eq. (3.7) and eq. (3.8). 
(ii) The coarse-weights and detail-weights of the speech signal are grouped in 
a 1D-array, as follows:  
[ ]21 ggG =        (3.18) 
(iii) The coarse-weights and detail-weights of the target speech signal are 
grouped in a 1D-array, as follows:  
[ ]21 ppP =       (3.19) 
(iv) The 1D arrays G and P are sorted in descending order. The initial positions 
of the weights are kept in the arrays ug and up, respectively. 
(v) Every weight of G is relocated, according to: 
 ( ) ( )gpa uGuG =       (3.20) 
Where Ga is the 1D-array that looks similar to P. It means: 
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( ) 1,2 ≈aGPρ        (3.21) 
(vi) With the 1D-array Ga the wavelet coefficients of the adapted speech signals 
are found, as follows:  















δ      (3.22) 











as kkGd ka δ      (3.23) 
The first-half of the normalized array Ga corresponds to the coarse-weights 
and the second-half corresponds to the detail-weights; 
{ }
aa
dc ss ,  contains 
the coarse and detail coefficients of the adapted speech signal. 
(vii) The Inverse Wavelet Transform, of { }
aa
dc ss ,  is calculated, according to: 
{ } [ ]nsdc aIDWTaa  →ss ,      (3.24) 
Where sa[n] is the adapted speech signal, in time domain.  
(viii) Finally, the dynamic range of the adapted speech signal is set to the same 
dynamic range of the target speech signals, as follows:  




















    (3.25)
 
The output signal has the same plaint-text, rhythm and gender of the 
speaker of the target speech signal if and only if the conditions described at 
the beginning of the section were previously satisfied. 
The following example illustrates the above steps.  The speech signal has the 
plain-text “good morning everybody” and the target speech signal has the plain-text 
“see you the next week”.  Both signals have been sampled with fs=8KHz and are from a 
female speaker.  The above signals were used in the first part of the current section as 
speech1 and speech2 (Figure 3.1a and 3.1b).  
Their wavelet coefficients are calculated by using the 5/3 base and they are 
grouped in 1D arrays (Figure 3.2). Then, these arrays are sorted in descending order 





Figure 3.6.  Sorted coefficients: a) target signal, b) speech signal 
According to Figure 3.6, the sorted target’s coefficients and the sorted speech’s 
coefficients have a similar behavior. The difference lies on the positive amplitude which 
is higher in the second signal. If the speech’s coefficients are relocated according to the 
information contained into the arrays of their original positions, the adapted-speech’s 





Figure 3.7.  Wavelet coefficients: a) target’s coefficients, b) adapted-speech’s 
coefficients 



























It is worth noting that the adapted-speech’s coefficients look similar to the 
target’s coefficients. Finally, the IDWT is applied to the adapted-speech’s coefficients 







Figure 3.8.  Time signals: a) secret message, b) target speech signal, c) adapted-
secret message 
The target speech signal and the adapted-speech signal have the sample plain-
text with the same rhythm as gender of the speaker.   
In the current example, the ratio of the non-zero coefficients is 0.846, and the 
level of similarity is 0.995. Additionally, as the ratio is close to 1, the perceptual 

























3.4. Experimental validation 
With the purpose to validate the hypothesis of adaptation, several tests have 
been performed. In the first part, the objective is to verify if adaptation is feasible in 
different cases as vowel to vowel, words to words, words to vowel and vowel to words.  
In the second part, the purpose is to verify if adaption depends on the language and 
gender of the speaker.  
3.4.1. Different kinds of sounds 
In this set of tests, the speech signals are divided in two groups: vowel signals 
and voice signals.  In the first group there are 5 vowel sounds in English language while 
in the second group there are six voice signals belonging to female and male speakers 
in English, French and German. The Sound Quality Assessment Material (SQAM) was 
selected as the database of the second group [58]. All the speech signals are sampled to 
8K Hz and quantized with 16-bits with a time-scale of five seconds.  
The following cases are taken into account: vowel to vowel, words to words, 
words to vowel, and vowel to words.  An example of each case is illustrated in Table 3.1. 
The first column enunciates the case of adaptation. The second column shows the level 
of similarity and the ratio of non-zero coefficients between the speech signal and the 
target speech signal. The third column plots (top-down) the speech signal, the target 
speech signal and the adapted speech signal. In the last column the speech’s 
coefficients, the target-speech’s coefficients and the adapted-speech’s coefficients are 
shown. The coefficients are 1D-arrays which include the coarse and detail of the signal, 





Table 3.1. Squared Correlation Coefficient & Ratio: examples of adaptation. [57] 
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According to the results shown on Table 3.1, it is noticed that: 
(i) It is not necessary a time synchronization between the speech signal and 
the target speech signal.  Due to the ability of adaptation, the adapted 
speech signal is in fact synchronized with the target speech signal. 
























































































































(ii) The ratio of the non-zero coefficients can be slightly higher or lower than 1, 
nevertheless the speech distortion index is close to 1 (and always ρ2> 0.95). 
(iii) The proposed method works both with single sounds (vowels, syllables) 
and words. A group of vowels can imitate words and the contrary is also 
possible. 
The summary of the tests is illustrated in Table 3.2. In every case the lowest and 
highest value and the confidence interval of the 95% are plotted. The first case, vowel 
to vowel, consists in 20 tests.  The five vowels work both as speech signal and as target 
speech signal and everyone is adapted to the rest of them. The second case, words to 
words, includes 30 tests.  Six records of female and male speakers in three languages 
are adapted between them. The third case, six word messages are adapted to five vowel 
signals in 30 tests. In the fourth case, five vowel signals are adapted to six words 
messages in 30 tests, too.  
 








According to Table 3.2, all of the adapted speech signals have a speech distortion 
index, ρ2, higher than 0.9, although the ratio of the non-zero coefficients is not exactly 












Case1 Case2 Case3 Case4
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have a ratio of non-zero coefficients closer to 1 than rest of them (third and fourth 
cases). It is expected that if the ratio is in [0.8 1.20], the adapted speech signal will have 
ρ2 higher than 0.95. The parameter ρ2 can be interpreted as the percentage of the 
coefficients of the adapted secret signal that are linearly correlated to the coefficients of 
the target speech signal. 
On the other hand, the p-value was taken into account in these experiments. It 
defines if the linear correlation is due to a coincidence or not; if the p-value is lower 
than 0.05 the idea about a coincidence is rejected. Since the p-values were always 
smaller than 0.05, then ρ2>0.9 is significant and the hypothesis of the adaptation of the 
speech signals is listed as true. 
 
3.4.2. Different language and gender of the speaker 
In this second group of tests, the hypothesis of adaptation is tested in relation to 
the gender and the language of the speech signals. Four scenarios are analyzed, as 
follows: 
(i) The language of the messages and the gender of the speakers of both the 
speech and the target speech signals are the same.  
(ii) The language of the messages is the same, but the gender of the speakers is 
different. 
(iii) The gender of the speakers is the same, but the language of the messages is 
different. 
(iv) Both the gender of the speakers and the language of the messages are 
different. 
The speech signals used in these tests correspond to 10 speech signals from 
female speakers in English language, 10 speech signals from male speakers in English 
language, 10 speech signals from female speakers in Polish language and 10 speech 
signals from male speakers in Polish language. Therefore, the total number of messages 
is 40 which correspond to 40 speakers. English and Polish languages were selected 
because they have strong dissimilarities in terms of phonetic sounds.  
The results by scenario are shown in Table 3.3. It includes the level of similarity 
(second column) and the ratio of the non-zero wavelet coefficients (third column). 
There are 4 cases by scenario, each one with 25 tests, for a total by scenario of 100 
tests. Every case is represented by its highest and lowest value, and the confidence 
interval of 95%. It uses the following notation to name the case: the first and the second 
letter are related to the gender and the language of the original speech signal, 
respectively and the third and the fourth letter are related to the gender and the 
language of the target speech signal, respectively. For example, the case [fP: mE] means 
that the speech signal is from a female (f) speaker in Polish (P) language and the target 
speech signal is from a male (m) speaker in English (E) language.  
According to Table 3.3, all of the results of the four scenarios have level of 
similarity higher than 0.9 (and their confidence ranges are higher than 0.98). It is worth 
noting that the first and second cases of the fourth scenario have ratio into the interval 
[0.88 1.25] and their index of similarity higher than 0.95; while the third and fourth 
cases have ratio outside the above interval and their index of similarity fell to 0.90.  
However, the index of similarity of the third case is better than of the fourth case. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the quality of the adapted speech signal has a strong 
relationship with ratio, and if it is the range [0.88 1.25] it is expected that the similarity 
between the adapted speech signal and the target speech signal will be high. Together 
with that, if ratio is outside of the above range, it is more desirable a value slightly 
higher than 1.25 instead of a value slightly lower than 0.88. 
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Table 3.3. Results by scenario. [59] 








































Summarizing, a speech signal can be adapted so that it resembles another speech 
signal if the theoretical requirements are satisfied even so if the gender of the speaker 













































[fE : mP] [mE : fP] [fP : mE] [mP : fE]
3.5. Summary 
The main ideas of this chapter are summarized as follows: 
(i) A powerful hypothesis of speech processing is presented. This is known 
as the ability of adaptation of speech signals, formulated as:  
any speech signal may seem similar to a target speech 
signal if its wavelet coefficients are sorted.  
(ii) The idea behind the ability of adaptation is related to the histograms of 
the non-zero wavelet coefficients of speech signals.  Although two speech 
signals have different time-behavior and frequency-behavior, their 
histograms (of the non-zero wavelet coefficients) can be similar. 
Therefore, if the time-frequency elements of a speech signal are relocated 
it is feasible that the output signal looks and sounds similar to a target 
speech signal. 
(iii) Several test of adaptation between vowel sounds and words sounds 
demonstrate that the adaptation is feasible between different kinds of 
sounds. 
(iv) Together with that, it is demonstrated that adaptation is feasible even if 
the language or/and the gender of the speaker are changed between the 











4. Speech scrambling and the ability 
of adaptation of speech signals 
 
A novel scheme of speech scrambling is presented in this chapter. Unlike the 
traditional approach in which the scrambled speech signal is a non-intelligible 
signal, the current proposal supplies a scrambled signal which is a perfectly 
legible signal, but with a plain-text different from the original speech signal. The 











In order to give protection to speech signals, many techniques of analog speech 
scrambling and digital encryption have been proposed. Among others, there are three 
aspects to take into account in any scrambling system: to produce a residual 
intelligibility as low as possible, to supply a high quality of the recovered signal even if 
the scrambled speech signal is manipulated, and to generate a long effective number of 
keys (key-space) for resisting cryptanalysis. Usually, the techniques are classified in 
permutation-based and amplitude scrambling (AS) [40], [41].  
Time-Segment Permutation, TSP, Frequency-Domain Scrambling, FDS, and Time-
Frequency Scrambling, TFS, are techniques of permutation-based speech scrambling. In 
the first case, TSP, the speech signal is divided in small blocks (typically 16 to 32 ms) 
and the permutations are made into the blocks according to a scrambling key, 
generated usually by a Pseudo-Noise (PN) generator [42], [60], [61]. Although it is a 
simple technique, it has some disadvantages as a small key-space, not low enough 
residual intelligibility, and low resistance to cryptanalysis. In the second case, FDS, the 
permutation process is carried out in the frequency domain [43], [44], [62]-[66]. The 
residual intelligibility may be lower than in TSP, but the key can be discovered using 
known cipher-text attacks [20], [21]. In the third case, TFS, the speech signal is split in 
subbands and every subband is divided in segments [46], [47]. It overcomes the 
disadvantage of its predecessors in terms of the residual intelligibility, but until now 
the problem of the small key-space has not been overcome.  
On the other hand, in the amplitude scrambling (AS) systems, the scrambled 
speech signal is not obtained by a permutation process, instead of that, the amplitude of 
the speech signal is modified so that it resembles a white noise signal [67]-[71]. These 
systems have mainly two disadvantages: firstly, it has been demonstrated that the 
scrambled speech signals do not overcome cryptanalysis attacks [72] and secondly, the 
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robustness against signal manipulations like MP3 compression, additive noise, filtering, 
among others, is not guaranteed. 
Since two of the most important requirements of speech scrambling are a priori 
not satisfied in AS systems, the effort should be focused on improvement the key-
generation in the permutation-based speech scrambling schemes. It encompasses to 
create a long key-space and adequate sequences that guarantee the very low residual 
intelligibility of the speech signal. In terms of long key-space, if the speech signal is not 
divided in sub-blocks and the entire speech signal is permutated, then the total number 
of possible combinations is significantly higher and consequently the effort to reveal 
the key by brute effort attack is not feasible. In terms of adequate sequences, the key-
generator must avoid the reverse and delay sequences because these do not destroy 
the intelligibility of the speech signal. In order to objectively classify if a sequence is 
appropriate or not, there are two parameters that quantify the level of displacement of 
data and the total number of data displaced out of their original places. They are known 
as the normalized displacement, Γnd, and the Hamming Distance, HD, respectively. If Γnd 
increases the residual intelligibility decreases, however there is a turning point in 
which the residual intelligibility increases again [42]. Since every limit value (Γnd ∼0 and 
Γnd ∼1) is related to the delay sequence and the reverse sequence, an appropriate value 
must be significantly higher than 0 and simultaneously very distant from 1. In the case 
of HD, if all elements are displaced out of their original places (HD=100%), the 
scrambled speech signal would have little residual intelligibility [44]. But if HD>90% 
and if the unpermuted elements are distributed randomly, the residual intelligibility is 
sufficiently low [43]. Summarizing, adequate sequences must have simultaneously HD 
higher than 90% and Γnd around the turning point. 
In the traditional approaches, the key-generator is based on PN sequences with a 
low number of elements (e.g. ∼90). However, in the last years alternative solutions have 
been proposed. The authors of [73] use high dimension matrix transformation to 
relocate the samples of the speech signal.  Although their scrambled speech signals are 
robust against MP3 attack, neither the low residual intelligibility nor the resistance 
against cryptanalysis is guaranteed. On the other hand, the authors of [74] use a 
cellular automaton (CE) to generate the permutation sequence. The advantage of the 
proposal is that the length of the key is up to the total number of samples of the speech 
signal and then the effort to discover the key is high. However, the residual 
intelligibility depends strongly on initial control conditions like the number of 
generations (NOG) and the neighborhood rule. If these parameters are not selected 
appropriately, the very low residual intelligibility is not reached. Consequently, the 
issue of an efficient key-generator for permutation-based speech scrambling systems 
has not been overcome yet. 
The aim is to generate a scrambled speech signal with the following 
characteristics: 
(i) Perfect Secrecy: it is satisfied if the key-space is equal to the secret-space, 
and the mapping process between the secret message and the scrambled 
speech signal is one-to-one [75]. If the above conditions are satisfied, the 
system resists the brute force and the known-cipher attacks. 
(ii) Very low residual intelligibility: if the permutations satisfy the condition of 
normalized displacement and the condition of Hamming Distance, little 
residual intelligibility is obtained. 
(iii) Robustness against signal manipulations attacks: the secret message is 
recovered even if the scrambled speech signal has been manipulated (e.g. 
MP3 compression, and additive noise, filtering). 
Therefore, it is proposed a speech scrambling system that simultaneously satisfies the 
above desirable conditions. The core is the ability of adaptation of speech signals 
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presented in Chapter 3. The secret message is adapted to the target speech signal which 
has non-sensitive information. Unlike traditional approaches in which the scrambled 
speech signal sounds like a white noise signal, in the proposal, the scrambled speech 
signal sounds like the target speech signal. The secret key is the mapping between the 
secret message and the target speech signal. With the secret key, the adaptation 
process is reversed and then the secret message is recovered. Consequently, the 
proposal is focused on protecting public data with private key. Suppose that you want 
to publish (e.g. on a web site) a speech signal which has sensitive information (secret 
message), but you want to protect the secrecy. The idea is to manipulate the secret 
message so that it resembles a target speech signal (which has non-sensitive 
information), and then the scrambled speech signal is published instead of the secret 
message. Therefore, although anyone can access the scrambled speech signal, the secret 
message is protected. Only the authorized user can reveal the secret message through 
the secret key (previously obtained through another channel). 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The idea behind the ability of 
adaptation of speech signals as a key-generator in a scrambling scheme is explained in 
Section 4.2. Remarkable results of the performance of the scrambling system are shown 
in Section 4.3.  Cryptanalysis is shown in Section 4.4. The chapter is summarized in 








4.2. The proposed scheme 
The scrambling system is based on the ability of adaptation of speech signals 
already presented in Chapter 3. It works with two speech signals: the secret message 
and the target speech signal. Once the conditions of adaptation have been verified (see 
Section 3.2), the scrambled speech signal is obtained as shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1. Flowchart of the scrambling process 
The steps are explained as follows: 
a) The speech signals are decomposed by using the Discrete Wavelet 
Transform with one level of decomposition.  The wavelet base must be the 
same in both cases. Since the wavelet decomposition of a signal gives 
coarse and detail coefficients, they are grouped in a one-dimensional array. 
Therefore, there is one 1D array per signal. At the output of this step the 
secret’s coefficients, st_c, and the target’s coefficients, tg_c, are obtained.   
b) The secret’s coefficients are relocated with the purpose to resemble the 
target’s coefficients.  For example, if the target’s coefficients are tg_c=[10, 9, 
6, 4, 8, 12, 14, 16] and the secret’s coefficients are st_c=[2, 5, 6, 9, 8, 4.5, 4, 
3], then the adapted secret’s coefficients, ast_c, are ast_c=[5, 4.5, 3, 2, 4, 6, 8, 
9]. Figure 4.2 shows the three groups of coefficients. It is remarkable the 




Figure 4.2. Example of adaptation. [76] 
The key is formed from the positions of ast_c in relation to the original 
positions in st_c.  The first value of the key contains the original position of 
the first value of ast_c, the second value of the key contains the original 
position of the second value of ast_c, and so on. In the current example, 
key=[2, 6, 8, 1, 7, 3, 5, 4].  
c) In the last step, the adapted secret’s coefficients are reconstructed by using 
the Inverse Discrete Wavelet Transform. The output is the scrambled 
speech signal. 
Then, the scrambled speech signal is transmitted together with the key. At the 
receiver, the secret message can be recovered with a reverse process of adaptation.  
The descrambling process is explained as follows (Figure 4.3): 
a) The scrambled speech signal is decomposed by the DWT, mono-level.  The 
wavelet base is the same used in the scrambling process. The coarse and 
detail coefficients are put together into an 1D array, ast_c.   
b) The adapted secret coefficients, ast_c, are relocated according to the key. 
For example, if ast_c=[5, 4.5, 3, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9] and key=[2, 6, 8, 1, 7, 3, 5, 4], the 
recovered secret’s coefficients, rst_c, are obtained as rst_c=[2, 5, 6, 9, 8, 4.5, 
















Figure 4.3. Flowchart of the descrambling process  
c) Once the adapted process has been reverted in the wavelet domain, the 
IDWT is applied to the recovered secret’s coefficients.  The output is the 
recovered secret message. If the scrambled speech signal has not been 
manipulated, it is expected that the recovered secret message will be 
exactly equal to the original secret message. Nevertheless, although the 
scrambled speech signal suffers small amplitude changes, the recovered 
secret message will be very similar to the original secret message. 
The proposed scheme is illustrated with an example.  Suppose we have two 
speech signals with different language and gender of the speaker. The secret message  
is in English language from a male speaker with the  plain-text in the last lecture, we 
dealt with unit four and the target speech signal is in Catalan language from a female 
speaker with the plain-text tornem un moment al que vam fer a l'última classe. Then, the 
secret message is adapted so that it resembles the target speech signal. The scrambled 
(or adapted) speech signal sounds highly similar to the target speech signal –with the 
same rhythm, gender and plain-text-. Therefore, the scrambled signal is transmitted 
together with the key. At the receiver, the adaptation process is reversed and the 
recovered secret message is obtained.  
Table 4.1 shows the secret message, the target speech signal, the scrambled 
speech signal and the recovered secret message. In the current example, the value of 
ratio is equal to 0.9516, the level of similarity between the target speech signal and the 
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scrambled speech signal is 0.9782 and the level of similarity between secret message 
and recovered secret message is ∼1. Since the plain-text of the secret message is 
completely different from the plain-text of the target speech signal, it is expected that 
the residual intelligibility will be close to zero.  On the other hand, since the adaptation 
can be completely reversed, the recovered secret message is equal to the original secret 
message. 
















Finally, in terms of key-generation, the proposal has the following characteristics 
[76]: 
(a) The key length is the same as the secret’s coefficients length. It is expected 
that the key length is at least 8K per second (for a speech signal sampled at 8K Hz). 
The higher the time-scale of the speech signal, the higher is the key length. 
(b) If the key length is m, it has m non-repetitive numbers in the range [1 m].  
(c) Computational cost to obtain the key in the scrambling procedure is very 
low. Since the kernel of adaptation is the sorting process and two arrays are sorted, the 
computational cost to create the key is the double of O(m log m). 
(d) Computational cost to discover the key is very high. An eavesdropper needs 
m! attempts to obtain the right key.   
























































4.3. Experimental validation 
In order to validate the ability of adaptation as a key-generator into a speech 
scrambling system, several tests were conducted to measure the level of permutation. 
Two sets of speech signals have been used; the first one corresponds to English 
messages of a male speaker and the second one to Catalan messages of a female 
speaker. These records have been taken from the database of the SLT at the Universitat 
Politecnica de Catalunya [77]. Firstly, ten English messages are adapted to ten Catalan 
messages and vice versa. Secondly, the English messages are adapted between them, 
and the same process is carried out with the Catalan messages. At the end, there are 
100 tests of adaptation of English messages to Catalan messages, 100 test of Catalan 
messages to English messages, 90 tests of adaptation between English messages and 90 
tests of adaptation between Catalan messages.  
In every case three parameters are measured: the normalized displacement (Γnd), 
the level of derangement (HD) and the ratio of the non-silent time of every pair of 
speech signals, (ratio). Together with that, the level of similarity between the scrambled 
speech signal and the target speech signal is taken into account.  























Where N is the number of elements in the array, γ  is the value of the extent of the 
shifting and |.| is the magnitude symbol. The value of Γnd is in the range [0 1].  If Γnd =0, it 
means that the elements have not been permutated; but if Γnd =1, the elements were 
placed in the most distant position possible. 
72 
 









== 1  ;  ( )
( ) ( )












  (4.2) 
Where i(k) is the original array, p(k) is the permuted array and d(k) is the 
difference array. If all elements are permuted, HD is equal to 1 (or 100%) and it is 
known as derangement.  
The ratio and the similarity were defined in equations (3.3) and (3.2), respectively. 
Similarity is measured through Squared Pearson Correlation Coefficient because it has 
been demonstrated that this parameter can be viewed as a speech distortion index; and 
it gives an indication on the strength of the linear relationship between two speech 
signals [78]. 
In [57], the relationship between the ratio of the non-silent time and the 
similarity between the original speech signal and the adapted (or scrambled) speech 
signals was presented. Now, the aim is to establish the value of the normalized 
displacement and the level of derangement to guarantee a right performance of the 
ability of adaptation into a scrambling system. 
4.3.1. Relationship between Γnd  and ρ2 
The aim is to analyze the relationship between the level of similarity and the 
normalized displacement. Since the objective of destroying the intelligibility of the 
secret message is satisfied if the scrambled speech signal is highly similar to the target 
speech signal, the current purpose is to guarantee that the value of ρ2 is the highest 
possible. Consequently, at the end of the test, a suggested value of Γnd is obtained. 
The results are grouped in four scenarios: adaptation from English to Catalan 
messages, adaptation from Catalan to English messages, adaptation between Catalan 
messages and adaptation between English messages. Figure 4.4 shows the results, 
where tg represents the target speech signal and st the secret message. The red dotted 
line is the threshold for the lowest level of similarity (0.9). The desirable behavior is 
found above this line. Since the ratio values of the selected English messages have the 
lowest dispersion, their values of Γnd and ρ2 have the lowest dispersion, too (Fig 4.4.d). 
In the opposite case, since the ratio values between English to Catalan message (and 
vice versa) have the highest dispersion, their values of Γnd and ρ2 have the highest 











Figure 4.4.  Similarity and Normalized displacement: a) tg =Catalan messages, 
st=English messages; b) tg=English messages, st =Catalan messages; c) [tg st] =Catalan 



































According to Figure 4.4.a and 4.4.b, if Γnd is lower than ∼0.25, all values of ρ2 are 
higher than (or equal to) 0.9. In the case of Figure 4.4.c and 4.4.d if Γnd is lower than 
∼0.3, all values of ρ2 are higher than (or equal to) 0.9. Because the threshold of Γnd 
should satisfy all the scenarios, the lower value among them is selected as the 
suggested value. Then, if the normalized displacement, Γnd, is lower than 0.25, it is 
expected that the adaptation process is successful and the scrambled speech signal is 
highly similar to the target speech signal; therefore, the residual intelligibility is very 
low. 
4.3.2. Relationship between Γnd  and the ratio of the non-silent time 
Once the suggested value of Γnd has been selected, the following aim is to identify 
the range of the ratio values that guarantees a successful adaptation of the secret 
message. Figure 4.5 plots the results of this test. In this case, a red dotted line 
represents the threshold for the highest level of normalized displacement. The 
desirable behavior is found left of this line. 
First of all, it is important to remark that the slope of ratio in Fig 4.5.a is negative 
because the non-mute time of the selected Catalan messages is lower than the non-
mute time of the selected English messages, and consequently in Fig 4.5.b the slope of 
ratio is positive. On the other hand, because the ratio values of the selected Catalan 
messages are more dispersed, data in Fig 4.5.c is more dispersed than in Fig 4.5.d.  
According to Figure 4.5, if ratio is in the range [0.8 1.3], most of the points of Γnd 
are lower than the threshold fixed in 0.25. Therefore, if ratio is in the range [0.8 1.3], 
the displacement of the secret’s coefficients is such that the adaptation is successful 
(high similarity between the scrambled speech signal and the target speech signal) and 












Figure 4.5. Ratio and Normalized displacement: a) tg =Catalan messages, 
st=English messages; b) tg=English messages, st =Catalan messages; c) [tg st] =Catalan 
messages, d) [tg st] =English messages. [76] 
4.3.3. Relationship between HD and the ability of adaptation 
In the 380 tests, it has been found that the number of permuted elements was 
always higher than 97.5% and in most cases higher than 99.9%.  For example, if a 
speech signal has 40,000 wavelet coefficients, at least 39,000 of them are placed out of 
their original position.  
Since HD∼100%, it is expected that a scrambling system based on the ability of 
adaptation of the speech signals would have a high enough level of derangement to 
















































4.4. Security Analysis 
Once the speech scrambled system has been tested in terms of the level of 
derangement and the normalized displacement, the following step to validate the 
current proposal is in terms of security analysis. Among the tests to overcome are: 
exhaustive key search (brute force attack), cipher-text only attack and statistical attack.  
4.4.1. Exhaustive key search 
The first attack that a good cryptosystem must overcome is the brute force 
attack. A long enough key-space guarantees that the key will not be discovered by an 
exhaustive key search. If the key size is m, the total number of possible combinations is 
m! Nevertheless, unlike plain-text in which every letter is represented by only one 
character, in the case of speech signals every sound (vowel or syllable) is represented 
by several samples and therefore several wavelet coefficients. Consequently, there are 
several keys (close to the right key) that produce a descrambled speech signal with the 
same plain-text of the secret message. Without loss of generality, suppose that an 
average person speak n sounds (vowel or syllable) per second and the total number of 
different sounds is p (with p significantly higher than the number of symbols in a 
language). Therefore, the total number of different plain-texts per second is (p!)n. If the 
speech signal has t seconds, the above value increases up to (p!)n*t. Consequently, an 
eavesdropper needs to test between (p!)n*t to m! attempts. For example, suppose that 
the secret message has 5-seconds with 40K wavelet coefficients, then the total number 
of possible combinations is (40K)! If the secret message encompasses only vowels (the 
most simple case), p=5 and suppose that n=8. Then, in the best scenario the lowest 
number of attempts is (5!)8*5=(5!)40=1.46*1083 which is long enough to be discovered. 
In the current example, an eavesdropper needs to test between 1.46*1083 and (40K)! 
attempts. [76] 
4.4.2. Cipher-text only attack 
It is a well-known method of cryptanalysis in which the aim is to discover the key 
based on the envelope of the spectrum of the scrambled speech signal [20], [21]. In 
classical approaches, the spectrum of the scrambled speech signal has several 
discontinuities, and therefore, the key can be revealed if the blocks into the spectrum 
are relocated to form a smooth envelope. This technique is useful in scrambling 
schemes of FDS. Since in the proposal the scrambled speech signal looks like an 
intelligible speech signal with a smooth envelope of the spectrum, the key is not 
revealed with this type of attack. [76] 
4.4.3. Statistical attack and perfect secrecy 
According to Shannon’s theory, a cryptosystem has perfect secrecy if the number 
of secret messages is equal to the number of enciphered messages and the relationship 
between them is one-to-one [75].  In our case, because the length of the secret’s 
coefficients is equal to the length of the key and each key produces a different 
scrambled speech signal, our proposal has perfect secrecy. It is worth noting that 
although there are several speech signals that can sound with the same plain-text, the 
mapping process between the secret message and the scrambled speech signal is one-
to-one. In other words, the message-space length is exactly equal to the key-space 
length and the scrambled-space length. In terms of confusion and diffusion, if an 
eavesdropper intercepts the scrambled speech signal and he/she would have enough 
time to try all possibilities, he/she does not have certainty of which of them is the right 
secret message, because the distribution probability of the message-space is uniform. 
Through adaptation, there is not a prior relationship between the secret message and 





The current chapter is summarized as follows: 
(i) The ability of adaptation of speech signals has been used to scramble 
speech signals in wavelet domain. The system can be viewed as a special 
case of Time-Frequency Scrambling. Unlike traditional approaches, the key 
is not an input of the system; it is generated in the adaptation from the 
secret message to the target speech signal. 
(ii) The derangement level and the displacement value of the adaptation 
process give a residual intelligibility very low. Therefore, the most 
important feature in a scrambling system is satisfied. 
(iii) The effort required to obtain the secret key in the scrambling module is 
low, with a complexity of O(m log m), where m is the secret’s coefficients 
length. Nevertheless, the effort to find the key by an eavesdropper is hard 
because it is up to m! Consequently, it is concluded that the system 
overcomes the brute force attack. 
(iv) The system works with perfect secrecy because the key-space length is 
equal to the secret-space length, there are as many secret messages as 













5. Speech steganography using 
Efficient Wavelet Masking  
 
This chapter shows two schemes of speech steganography which take 
advantage of the ability of adaptation of speech signals and the masking 
property of the Human Auditory System (HAS).  The schemes are known as 
Efficient Wavelet Masking (EWM) and improved-EWM (iEWM). The first one is 
optimized in terms of statistical transparency and the second one in terms of 












The second analyzed method of speech hiding is steganography. The main 
difference related to scrambling is that the secret message is hidden into the host signal 
instead of modifying the secret message so it resembles a target speech signal (which 
can be a legible or non-legible speech signal).  
The output signal, known as the stego signal, must be perceptually equal to the 
host signal with the purpose of not generating suspicion about the existence of the 
secret message (transparency). The higher the number of bits of the secret message 
that are hidden, the higher is the hiding capacity. Additionally, a robust stego signal 
overcomes signal manipulations like lossy compression, re-quantization or resampling, 
among others. All of the features (transparency, hiding capacity and robustness) are 
known as the “magic triangle” and there is a strong relationship among them; when one 
increases at least one of the others decreases [5]. Therefore, it is not possible to 
simultaneously optimize the three above features. 
In the literature the following techniques of speech hiding are well known: Least 
Significant Bit (LSB) substitution, Frequency Masking (FM), Spread Spectrum (SS) and 
Shift Spectrum Algorithm (SSA) [3], [27], [79], [80]. In the case of LSB, the least 
significant bits of the host signal are replaced with the bits of the secret message [23], 
[24], [81]-[84]. If the number of replaced bits per sample increases, then HC and 
robustness increase too, but the transparency decreases. In the second scheme, FM, 
every coefficient of the secret message is hidden into one coefficient of the host signal if 
the masking criterion has been previously satisfied [35], [36], [85]. Since the hiding 
process follows masking criteria, the transparency and robustness are satisfied, 
however the hiding capacity can become lower than in LSB. In the third case, SS, the 
bandwidth of the secret message is spread into the bandwidth of the host signal [26], 
[86]. Finally, in the case of SSA, the bandwidth of the secret message is delayed to the 
highest subband of the bandwidth of the host signal [26], [87], [88]. Both SS and SSA 
have the smallest hiding capacities, but in some cases they have the highest value of 
transparency.  
Since none of the classical schemes of speech steganography have a good enough 
trade-off among transparency, hiding capacity and robustness, a novel scheme of 
speech-in-speech hiding based on the ability of adaptation of speech signals is 
proposed. This scheme is known as Efficient Wavelet Masking (EWM). An improved 
version of EWM in terms of robustness is known as iEWM. Both EWM and iEWM have 
the same hiding capacity in terms of time-scale. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 explains the proposed 
scheme known as Efficient Wavelet Masking and Section 5.3 shows its results in terms 
of statistical transparency. Section 5.4 explains the scheme iEWM and Section 5.5 











5.2. Efficient Wavelet Masking (EWM) 
In nature, one of the best examples of adaptation is the chameleon which adapts 
to the surrounding environment, changing its color, to become "imperceptible” and not 
be detected by enemies. In a similar way, the best form to hide data is by adapting them 
to the host signal. Because the main purpose of any steganographic model is that the 
secret message seems “imperceptible” into the host signal, the ability of adaptation of 
speech signals is used as the core of the proposed speech-in-speech hiding scheme 
known as Efficient Wavelet Masking [56].  
Like FM, EWM is based on the masking property of the HAS but the main 
difference lies on the “efficient” masking of the secret message dues to the principle of 
adaptation.   
The scheme encompasses two modules: the embedding module at the 
transmitter and the extraction module at the receiver. They are explained as follows. 
5.2.1. Embedding module 
It is carried out by the following steps: decomposition and scaling, efficient 
sorting, indirect LSB replacement, reconstruction and post-scaling (Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1. EWM: flowchart of the embedding module 
The steps are explained as follows: 
(i) Decomposition and scaling: both the secret message and the host signals are 
decomposed by using the DWT.   
[ ] ( )kSns DWT →    Ζ∈k   (5.1) 
[ ] ( )kHh DWT →n       (5.2) 
Where s[n] is the secret message, h[n] is the host signal, S(k) is the group of 
secret’s coefficients and H(k) is the group of host’s coefficients. 
Then, the secret’s coefficients are attenuated -12dB under the dynamic 
range of the host’s coefficients. If the host’s coefficients are quantized to 16 
bits in the range [-215+1 to 215-1], then, the secret’s coefficients are 
quantized to 14 bits in the range [-213+1 to 213-1]. 
(ii) Efficient sorting (adaptation): the secret’s coefficients are relocated so that 
they resemble the host’s coefficients. The original and final places of the 
secret’s coefficients are used to build the key (in a way similar to that 
explained in Chapter 4). 
(iii) Indirect LSB replacement: once the adapted-secret’s coefficients have been 
obtained, the division between every pair of coefficients (from host’s 
coefficients and adapted-secret’s coefficients) is calculated, according to: 
( ) ( )
( )kH
kS
kdiv a=       (5.3) 
Where Sa(k) is the group of adapted-secret’s coefficients.  
Since the dynamic range of the secret’s coefficients is a quarter of the 
dynamic range of the host’s coefficients, it is expected that the division is 
close to 0.25; nevertheless, it could be higher. Then, the value of div is 
normalized so that it can be represented by 5-bits, as follows: 
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*31=      (5.4) 
Where Pd is called as the Percentage data and max(.) is the maximum 
function. Once Pd has been obtained, this is hidden into the 5-LSBs of the 
host’s coefficient, according to: 














    (5.5) 
Where St(k) is the group of stego’s coefficients and . is the floor function. 
For example if H(1)=3455=0000110101111111b and Pd(1)=20=10100b then 
St(1) = {3455/32*32} + 20 = 3444 = 0000110101110100. It is equal to 
replace the 5-LSBs of H(1) with Pd(1) and it is obtained 
St(1)=0000110101110100b. 
The advantage of using an indirect substitution form is that the number of 
bits replaced is less than in a direct form. Although only five bits are 
replaced in every wavelet coefficient, a speech signal of 14 bits is indirectly 
hidden into a speech signal of 16 bits. For this reason, it is expected that the 
transparency in the stego signal is higher than in other schemes.     
(iv) Reconstruction and post-scaling: in the last step, the stego’s coefficients are 
reconstructed by using the IDWT with the same wavelet base of the first 
step.  
( ) [ ]ngkG IDWT →      (5.6) 
Where st[n] is the stego signal in time domain.  Finally, the signal is set in 
the dynamic range of [-1 1]. 
 
 
5.2.2. Extraction module 
The secret key and the stego signal are the inputs of the module, while the output 
is the recovered secret message. This module is constituted by the following 
subsystems: decomposition and scaling, recovering, reconstruction and post-scaling 
(Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2. EWM: flowchart of the extraction module 
The steps are explained, as follows 
(i) Decomposition and scaling: the stego signal is decomposed by using the 
DWT.   
[ ] ( )kGng DWT →       (5.7) 
(ii) Recovering: the 5-LSBs of the stego’s coefficients are extracted, according 
to: 















kGkPd     (5.8) 
Then, the adapted-secret’s coefficients are obtained by the multiplication 
between the stego’s coefficients and the percentage data, Pd, as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )kStkPdkSa *=      (5.9) 
Finally, the adapted-secret’s coefficients, Sa(k), are relocated according to 
the key and then the recovered-secret’s coefficients, Sr(k), are obtained. At 
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this point, the adaptation process is reversed and the output, Sr(k), has the 
same behavior of the secret’s coefficients.  
(iii) Reconstruction and post-scaling: the recovered-secret’s coefficients are 
reconstructed by using the IDWT.  
( ) [ ]nsrkSr IDWT →       (5.10) 
Where sr[n] is the recovered-secret message. 




















5.3. Performance of EWM 
The statistical transparency is considered in this thesis to establish the quality of 
the stego signal and its robustness against some steganalysis techniques. The objective 
in any steganalysis test is to find signs about the existence of a secret message into the 
speech signal. Most steganalysis methods use an intelligent system which is trained 
with statistics of host and stego signals. Then, the speech signal is analyzed and it is 
classified as a host or stego signal. In this work, the stego signals are tested by three 
steganalysis methods to measure the difference between the statistics of the host signal 
and the stego signal and determine if this is smaller than a threshold.  If the criterion is 
satisfied, the stego signal does not create suspicion about the existence of the secret 
message and it can be transmitted in a secure channel. If this difference is large for any 
of the statistics, the stego signal could be identified by an expert system and therefore 
the message will be vulnerable.  
Three domains have been used in this work to assess the statistical transparency: 
time domain, frequency domain, and wavelet domain. In the time domain, the test is 
based on the log function of the speech signal proposed by [12]. In the frequency 
domain, the test is based on the second-order derivative of the audio signal proposed 
by [15]. Finally, in the wavelet domain, the test is based on the statistical analysis of 
wavelet subbands proposed in [17]. The statistical analysis is carried out by obtaining 
the fourth first moments of these functions: average (µ), variance (σ2), skewness (sk) 
and kurtosiss (k). The difference in the statistics is estimated in the five methods 
considered in this chapter: LSB, FM, SS, SSA, and the proposed one, EWM.  Additionally, 
five hiding capacities have been taken into account in order to evaluate the 




5.3.1. Statistical transparency  
The performance of the five schemes against three steganalysis tests is tested.  In 
every experiment, the differences between the statistics of the host and the stego 
signals are calculated. To organize the experiments, five values of hiding capacity (in 
terms of the time-scale: 25%, 33%, 50%, 75% and 100%) are analyzed. The capacity 
corresponds to the percentage of the time-scale of the secret message in relation to the 
time-scale to the host signal; if both signals have the same time-scale, the hiding 
capacity is 100% even if the number of replaced LSBs is not the same. The SSA scheme 
is only tested with its maximum capacity, 25%, SS scheme is tested with 25% and 33%; 
EWM, LSB and FM are tested with the five capacities. One host signal and five secret 
messages are used, one for every hiding capacity. The length of the host signal is 2-
seconds and the frequency sampling of each one is 8 KHz.  
Table 5.1. Signals for HC=100%: Input signal & Difference signal. [56] 
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Table 5.1 illustrates some differences among the three steganalysis methods with 
HC=100%. In every row two signals are plotted, the host signal (in logarithmic form, 
spectrum or wavelet decomposition) and the difference signal (between the host signal 
and the stego signal in the selected domain). It is confirmed that with the EWM scheme 
the transparency is better than with other methods, such as LSB and FM. This can be 
easily seen in the steganalysis test in wavelet domain.  
Now, Figures 5.3 to 5.5 show the difference between the statistics of the host 
signal and the statistics of the stego signal, for every steganalysis test and 










Figure 5.3. Difference (%) in the temporal steganalysis test: a)average, 
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In the steganalysis test in time domain, the maximum difference (7.8%) belongs 
to the skewness in the FM scheme. EWM scheme has a result similar to SSA in low 
capacities, while in high capacities, the best performance corresponds to the EWM 
scheme. The difference in EWM is ever lower than 0.5%, while in the LSB scheme is 
lower than 1%. In this test, the schemes didn’t give any sign about the existence of the 
secret message, because the statistics of the stego signals were very similar to the 
statistics of the host signals.  In other words, it is difficult for a classifier to identify the 










Figure 5.4. Difference (%) in the frequency domain steganalysis test: a) average, 
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According to Figure 5.4, for low capacities (25% and 33%) EWM has the smallest 
differences in 75% of the statistics, while LSB has the smallest in 25% of the statistics. 
For high capacities, EWM’s differences are lower than 3.5%; LSB’s differences are lower 
than 10%, while FM’s differences are lower than 13%. It means that EWM is the best 











Figure 5.5. Difference (%) in the wavelet steganalysis test: a) average, b) 
variance, c) skewness, d)kurtosis. [56] 
Finally, the steganalysis test in wavelet domain is presented in Figure 5.5. This 
test gives the highest difference in the statistics between the host and the stego signal.  
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the host and the stego signals, then the stego signals should pass any steganalysis 
method based on time, frequency or time-frequency domain. According to the results, 
the worst case corresponds to the FM scheme, because its difference became 50%, and 
the most stable scheme is EWM, since the difference increases very little from a 
capacity to another and 95% of its statistics are lower than in the other schemes.  
Summarizing, it has been found that the most stable model is EWM, because even 
if the size of the secret message increases with the hiding capacity, the maximum 
difference between the statistics of the host and the stego signals remains below 10%. 
The remaining methods either increase its error with the capacity or between tests. 
 
5.3.2. Hiding Capacity and other quality parameters 
In addition to the statistical transparency, the quality of the recovered secret 
message plays an important role in any steganalysis scheme. In Table 5.2, (first 
column), the correlation coefficient in every scheme is illustrated. Every value of hiding 
capacity has one pair of host signal and secret message. 
In low capacities (HC=25%, 33%) the performance of the EWM, LSB, and SS 
schemes is similar and it is better than the performance of the SSA and FM schemes. In 
high capacities (HC≥50%), LSB is significantly better than FM and slightly better than 
EWM. Summarizing, in terms of quality in the recovered secret message, the best 
scheme is the LSB and the worst is the FM scheme; while EWM scheme has the second 
position. 
Second, it is analyzed the relation between the hiding capacity and the size of the 
secret key. The LSB, SS and SSA schemes do not need a secret key for recovering the 
secret message, but EWM and FM use a secret key to keep the positions of the secret 
coefficients. In the second column of Table 5.2, the percentage of the size of the secret 
key in relation to the size of the host signal is shown. The size of the EWM scheme is 
slightly higher than the FM, and this value is proportional to the hiding capacity. In an 
ideal way, these sizes should be equal, but the difference is due to the failure to hide 
information in FM. In the third column of Table 5.2, the percentage of failure in data 
hiding in every scheme demonstrates that FM does not guarantee that all of the secret 
coefficients can be hidden into the host signal.  
Table 5.2. Performance in other selected quality parameters, for HC=25%, 33%, 50%, 
75% and 100%. [56] 
Squared Pearson 
Correlation Coefficient 
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5.4. Improved Efficient Wavelet Masking 
The EWM is an “optimized” scheme is terms of the statistical transparency of the 
stego signal but it is not good enough in terms of the robustness against signal 
manipulations. Since only 5-LSBs of the host’s coefficients are modified, the stego signal 
does not tolerate small changes (e.g. ∼0.1%) in its amplitude and then the bits related 
to Pd can be lost. Therefore, an “optimized” scheme in terms of robustness based on the 
EWM is presented in this section.  Nevertheless, there is a trade-off among the 
transparency, the hiding capacity and the robustness and it is expected that the new 
scheme, the improved-EWM (or iEWM), is less transparent than its predecessor. 
The core of iEWM is the ability of adaptation of speech signals and the selective 
Significant-Bit-to-Hold (SBH). With the purpose of increasing the robustness, the 
number of replaced LSBs depends on the amplitude of the host’s coefficient instead of a 
fixed number of LSBs of its predecessor, the EWM scheme. The larger the host’s 
coefficient, the higher the number of replaced LSBs.  Since the larger coefficients would 
hide a higher number of bits, it is expected that the robustness of the stego signal will 
improve.  
The embedding and extraction modules are described as follows. 
5.4.1. Embedding module  
The purpose of this module is to hide a secret signal into the host signal. The 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 5.6. It contains the following steps: decomposition, 
efficient sorting and scaling, selective Significant-Bit-to-Hold, reconstruction and post-
scaling. Every step is detailed as follows: 
(i) Decomposition and scaling: both signals, the host and the secret one, are 
decomposed by using the Discrete Wavelet Transform. To obtain the same 
number of wavelet coefficients, the number of the samples of the signals 
and the wavelet base used in the decomposition must be equal in both 
cases.  The relation between the input and the output is defined by: 
[ ] ( )wSns DWT →      (5.11) 
[ ] ( )wHnh DWT →      (5.12) 
Where s[n], h[n], S(w), H(w) are the secret signal, the host signal, the 
secret’s coefficients and the host’s coefficients, respectively. Unlike the 
EWM scheme, the secret signal is not attenuated by -12dB in relation to the 
host signal. 
 
Figure 5.6. Block diagram of the improved-EWM embedding module 
(ii) Efficient sorting and scaling: the secret’s coefficients are relocated so that 
they resemble the host’s coefficients. It uses the ability of adaptation of the 
speech signals proposed in Chapter 3. Once the coefficients have been 
relocated, the dynamic range of the adapted-secret’s coefficients and the 
host’s coefficients are modified to work with integer values in the next step, 
in the dynamic range [-215+1 215-1]. The design works with a resolution of 
16-bits, but the scheme can be easily extrapolated. 
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Like the EWM scheme, the original positions of the secret’s coefficients are 
kept in a 1D-array.  With the original and new positions after the sorting 
process, the secret key is created.  
(iii) Selective Significant Bit-to-hold: the aim of this block is to hold some of the 
most significant bits (MSBs) of the host’s coefficients and replace the rest of 
them. Since every host’s coefficient has specific amplitude, the number of 
replaced bits depends on its amplitude and the selective Significant-Bit-to-
Hold (SBH). The larger the host’s coefficient, the higher the number of 
replaced LSBs.  Without loss of generality, assume that the minimum 
number of bits to represent the host’s coefficient is n, and then the number 
of replaced bits is n-SBH. If SBH is high, only a few bits are replaced and the 
transparency of the stego signal would be high, otherwise the number of 
replaced bits is large and the transparency would be low. Nonetheless, the 
lower the number of replaced bits, the lower the robustness against signal 
manipulations. The trade-off between the robustness and the transparency 
related to the value of SBH will be discussed in section 5.5. 
The stego’s coefficient is calculated from the host’s coefficient, the adapted-
secret’s coefficient, n and SBH, according to: 























   (5.13) 
Where G(w) is the stego’s coefficient. It is noticed that the adapted-secret’s 
coefficient, Sa(w), is attenuated by the factor 1/2SBH+1. For example, if 
H(1)=14102, Sa(1)=12800, n=14 and SBH=4, the stego’s coefficient is 
calculated as G(1)=14102/210*210+12800/25=13312+400=13712. 
In binary format, H(1)b=11011100010110, SsN(1)/25b=0110010000 and 
G(1)b=11010110010000. In the current example, the 10-LSBs of the host’s 
coefficient have been replaced. 
(iv) Reconstruction: the stego signal, g[n], is obtained from the stego’s 
coefficients by using the Inverse Discrete Wavelet Transform (IDWT), as 
follows: 
( ) [ ]ngwG IDWT →     (5.14) 
Finally, the dynamic range of the stego signal is set in the interval [-1 1]. 
 
5.4.2. Extraction module  
The aim of the extraction module is to obtain an estimate of the secret message 
from the stego signal. The steps are plotted in Figure 5.7.  
 
Figure 5.7. Block diagram of the improved-EWM extraction module 
It includes decomposition, recovering selective LSB, and reconstruction. They are 
detailed as follows. 
(i) Decomposition and scaling: the stego signal, g[n], is decomposed by using 
the Discrete Wavelet Transform, as follows. 
[ ] ( )wGng DWT →      (5.15) 
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Where G(w) is the stego’s coefficients. The wavelet base is the same used 
for the embedding module. The stego’s coefficients are scaled to obtain 
integer numbers in the range [-2-15+1 215-1]. 
(ii) Recovering selective LSB: the purpose of this step is to recover the bits 
related to the secret’s coefficients.  Like in the embedding process, the 
value of SBH is used to calculate the output, according to: 






















  (5.16) 
Where Sa(w) is the group of adapted-secret’s coefficients. In this case, the 
value of n is the minimum number of bits used to represent the stego’s 
coefficient. For example, if G(1)=13712, SBH=4 and n=14, it is obtained that 
Sa(1)=[13712-13712/210*210]*25=12800. In the current example, the 
result is equal to extract the 10-LSBs of the stego’s coefficient and then 
scale it according to 2SBH+1. It is noticed that the result of Sa is the same as in 
the hiding process presented in the current section. 
Finally, the adaptation process is reversed according to the key. At the 
output, the recovered-secret’s coefficients, Sr(w), are obtained. 
(iii) Reconstruction and post-scaling: the recovered-secret’s coefficients are 
reconstructed by the IDWT and the recovered-secret’s message is obtained, 
as follows:  
( ) [ ]nsrkSr IDWT →     (5.17) 
Where sr[n] is the recovered-secret message. A post-scaling is applied to 
set the dynamic range of the signal in the interval [-1 1]. 
It is worth noting that the main difference between EWM and iEWM lies on the 
LSB substitution step, in the first it uses an indirect fixed substitution and in the later it 


















5.5. Relationship between robustness and transparency of the iEWM 
In this section, several tests are conducted to demonstrate the robustness of the 
improved Efficient Wavelet Masking, iEWM. The speech signals from then Sound 
Quality Assessment Material (SQAM) are used in the tests. They belong to female and 
male speakers in English language [58]. Before the signal manipulations, the sounds are 
re-sampled to 8 KHz, the resolution is preserved in 16 bits, and the Bit Rate (BR) is 128 
kbps. The following signal manipulations (attacks) are selected to test the robustness of 
the proposed scheme: lossy compression, resampling and re-quantization. Firstly, the 
stego signal is lossy compressed with four Bit Rates (BR1=64kbps, BR2=48kbps, 
BR3=32kbps and BR4=24kbps). Secondly, the stego signal is decimated/interpolated by 
the factor Q (Q1=5/4, Q2=4/3, Q3=5/3, Q4=2). Thirdly, the stego signal is quantized at 8-
bits. The performance of the speech hiding schemes in terms of the statistical 
transparency and the quality of the recovered secret signal are measured. In the first 
one, the statistics of the host signal and the manipulated stego signal are taken into 
account. In the second one, the speech distortion index between the secret signal and 
the recovered secret signal from the manipulated stego signal is calculated. Thereafter, 
the iEWM and EWM schemes will be compared through different values of the SBH. 
Finally, once the SBH has been selected, iEWM is compared to some of the speech-in-
speech hiding schemes in order to illustrate the high robustness of the proposed 
method. 
 
5.5.1. Selecting SBH 
The iEWM and its predecessor are compared in order to select an adequate SBH 
which satisfies the trade-off between transparency and robustness. The tests values are 
SBH1=1, SBH2=2, SBH3=4 and SBH4=6.  The objective is to preserve the high 
transparency while increasing the robustness against standard benchmark attacks.  
The selected signal manipulations are analyzed as follows.  
Lossy compression: table 5.3 plots the histograms of the logarithm of the host 
signal and the logarithm of the compressed stego signals (from EWM and iEWM). It is 
shown for the following Bit Rates: BR1=64, BR2=48, BR3=32 and BR4=24.  Since the 
uncompressed host signal has BR=128, the Compression Ratio (CR) of each case is 
CR1=2, CR2=2.6, CR3=4 and CR4=5.3. 






















































































































































































Figure 5.8 shows the speech distortion index of the recovered secret message. 
The x-axis corresponds to the Compression Rate while the y-axis to the Squared 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient.  
 
Figure 5.8. Lossy compression test: quality of the recovered secret message  
According to the results of Table 5.3 and Figure 5.8, it is noticed that the 
statistical transparency of the iEWM scheme is close to the EWM when SBH=4 and 
SBH=6.  In the case of SBH=1, the histogram of the compressed stego signal is highly 
different to the host signal. On the other hand, the higher the CR, the more degraded are 
the recovered secret signals. Nevertheless, iEWM with SBH<4 demonstrated better 
performance than the EWM scheme, while the results of SBH=4 are better in three of 
the five cases. Analyzing the trade-off between statistical transparency and quality of 
the recovered secret signal, it is found in the current case that SBH=4 has the best 
relationship. 
Resampling: in this attack the sampling frequency, fc, of the speech signal is 
modified. Firstly, the signal is decimated and secondly the signal is interpolated, by a 
factor of Q. The higher the value of Q, the lower is the number of samples after the 












factors: Q1=5/4, Q2=4/3, Q3=5/3 and Q4=2. The histograms of the logarithm of the 
host signal and the logarithm of the resampled stego signals are illustrated in Table 5.4. 
According to Table 5.4, iEWM is close to the host’s histogram (and the EWM’s 
histogram) when SBH=4 and SBH=6.  The graphs of SBH=1 and SBH=2 can give 
suspicion about the existence of a secret signal.  
















The quality of the recovered secret signal from the manipulated stego signals are 
shown in Figure 5.9. The x-axis corresponds to the Q factor and the y-axis to the 










































































































































































Figure 5.9. Resampling test: quality of the recovered secret signal 
Unlike the compression attack, the quality of the recovered secret signal for 
SBH<6 is always better than in the EWM scheme; only for Q=2, the EWM scheme is 
better than one of the iEWM cases.  
Re-quantization: the quantization of the speech signals is transformed from 16 
to 8 bits. The statistical transparency (histogram) and the quality of the recovered 
secret signal (speech distortion index) are shown in Table 5.5.  
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According to Table 5.5, only the histogram from SBH=4 is similar to the host’s 
histogram.  On the other hand, the quality of the recovered secret signal is significantly 
higher in SBH=4 than from the EWM scheme.  
Summarizing, the iEWM scheme has the best trade-off between statistical 
transparency and quality of the recovered secret signal in the three analyzed attacks 
(lossy compression, resampling and re-quantization) when SBH=4. For this reason, it is 
suggested to use the iEWM scheme with the above value. 
5.5.2. Comparison of the proposed and classical schemes 
Once the SBH has been selected, the next step is to compare the performance of 
the proposed scheme with other speech-in-speech hiding methods. The LSB and FM 
schemes have been selected because they permit to hide a speech signal into another 
speech signal of the same time-scale, like in the EWM and iEWM ones.   
The current test is divided in two parts. Firstly, the statistical transparency and 
the quality of the recovered secret message are measured before the signal 
manipulations. Secondly, the same features are taken in account for lossy compression, 
resampling and re-quantization attacks. A predefined value is used in each case, CR=5.3 
(BR=24) in lossy compression, Q=2 in resampling and resolution of 8-bits in re-
quantization. The test signals are from the Sound Quality Assessment Material (SQAM). 
The host signal is a female English record while the secret signal is a male English one. 
Both of them have a time-scale of five seconds. 
Table 5.6 shows the performance of the three analyzed schemes in relation to the 
quality of the stego signal and the recovered secret signal. The signals in the time 
domain and the objective measurement parameters are plotted for each scheme. The 
parameters considered are the statistical transparency as given by the difference 
between the statistical moments of the logarithm of the host signal and the logarithm of 
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the stego signal, (esk: difference percentage in the skewness and ek: difference 
percentage in the kurtosis) and the quality of the recovered secret signal by the speech 
distortion index, ρ2. 
 
Table 5.6. Performance results without signal manipulation 
Performance 
Original  
(Host or Secret) 
LSB FM iEWM 
Host signal & 
Stego signal 
 
[esk%; ek%]  [0.72%; 0.75%] [1.99%; 2.59%] [1.90%; 2.29%] 




ρ2  0.9962 0.7389 0.9978 
According to Table 5.6, the statistical transparency of the stego signal is better in 
the LSB scheme, but the quality of the recovered secret signal is slightly better in the 
iEWM scheme.  Nevertheless, in all cases, both esk and ek are lower than 3%. The worst 
performance corresponds to the FM scheme. 
The second part of the current test consists on applying signal manipulations on 
the stego signals.  Firstly, the stego signals are transformed to MP3 format and then are 
forwarded into its original format. The statistical transparency is measured with the 
new stego signals and the recovered secret signals extracted from them (Table 5.7).  
According to Table 5.7, the statistical transparency is not highly affected by the 
compression attack and in fact it can improve. On the other hand, the quality of the 

















































case is in the LSB scheme (the recovered signal is not legible).  Although the FM scheme 
gives a moderate quality performance it is noticed that the best result is from the iEWM 
scheme. 
Table 5.7. Performance results: lossy compression attack (BR=24) 
Performance 
Original 
(host or secret) 
LSB FM iEWM 
Host signal & 
Stego signal 
 
[esk%; ek%]  [2.04%;1.92%] [1.51%; 1.56%] [0.34%; 1.50%] 




ρ2  0.0009 0.5916 0.7342 
Secondly, the stego signals are decimated by half of fc and then are interpolated 
by the double of the last fc. At the end, the attacked stego signal and the host signal 
have the same number of samples by second. The results are shown in Table 5.8.  
The robustness against the resampling attack is higher in the iEWM scheme since 
the quality of the recovered secret signal is closer to the secret signal and the 
measurement parameters of the statistical transparency remain below 3%. The FM 
scheme is the second scheme in terms of quality and statistical transparency. Although 
the statistical transparency of the LSB scheme is higher than for the others methods, 
the secret message cannot be recovered if the stego signal has been manipulated. On 
the other hand, it is remarkable that both FM and iEWM schemes give better results 



















































Table 5.8. Performance results: resampling attack (Q=2) 
Performance 
Original  
(Host or Secret) 
LSB FM iEWM 
Host signal & 
Stego signal 
 
[esk%; ek%]  [0.16 %; 0.12 %] [2.52%; 3.58%] [1.99%; 2.66%] 
Secret signal &  
Recovered 
secret signal 
ρ2  0.0059 0.7365 0.8049 
Finally, we tested the stego signals with the re-quantization attack.  The 
resolution of the stego signals is transformed from 16 to 8 bits.  Once the stego signal 
has been re-quantized, the secret signal is extracted.  Again, the statistical transparency 
of the attacked stego signal and the quality of the recovered secret signal is measured. 
Table 5.9 shows the results. 
According to Table 5.9, the iEWM scheme has a good robustness against the re-
quantization attack; its recovered secret signal is very closer to the original one.  
Together with that, the statistical transparency is high since the esk and ek parameters 
are under 3%. Unlike the LSB scheme, the FM scheme permits to recover the secret 
signal with a moderate quality index. 
Summarizing, in the three studied attacks the iEWM scheme has a better 
robustness than the LSB and FM schemes. The FM scheme permits to recover the secret 


















































Table 5.9. Performance results: re-quantization attack (resolution=8-bits) 
Performance 
Original  
(Host or Secret) 
LSB FM iEWM 
Host signal & 
Stego signal 
 
[esk%; ek%]  [0.51 %; 0.62 %] [2.35%; 2.93%] [1.92%; 2.25%] 
































































Two schemes of speech-in-speech hiding have been proposed with the following 
characteristics: 
(i) Both schemes, EWM and iEWM, are based on the ability of adaptation of 
speech signals taking in advantage the masking property of the HAS. The 
embedding and extraction processes are in wavelet domain. 
(ii) The first one, EWM, uses an indirect LSB substitution based on a 
parameter, Pd, which relates the amplitude of the host signal with the 
amplitude of the adapted-speech signal. The 5-LSBs of the host’s 
coefficients are replaced with the parameter Pd. 
(iii) Since only 5 bits of the host’s coefficients are changed in the embedding 
process, the transparency of the EWM is higher than in other schemes such 
as LSB and FM (with 8-bits of substitution). 
(iv) The maximum hiding capacity of EWM is significantly higher than in SS and 
SSA and equal to LSB and FM.  
(v) The weakness of EWM is the low robustness against signal manipulations. 
However, if the stego signal is not manipulated, the recovered secret 
message is highly similar to the original secret message. It has the same 
plain-text, intonation, rhythm and gender of the speaker. 
(vi) Unlike EWM, iEWM uses direct LSB substitution.  In this case, the adapted 
secret message is directly hidden into the host signal, in wavelet domain. 
The number of bits varies according to the amplitude of the host’s 
coefficients and therefore, the higher the amplitude, the higher is the 
number of replaced bits. Nevertheless, the MSB of the host’s coefficients are 
kept and it is controlled with the parameter Significant-Bit-to-Hold (SBH). 
(vii) According to the results of the tests performed, the most appropriate value 
of SBH is 4.  In this case, the transparency is slightly lower than in EWM but 
the robustness is significantly better. 
(viii) In terms of robustness iEWM is an advisable scheme because it allows 
recovering the secret message with better quality than in other schemes 


















6. Speech hiding on hardware devices  
 
This chapter shows the design and simulation of a real-time speech hiding 
scheme on hardware devices. The scheme encompasses wavelet decomposition, 
sorting unit and reconstruction. The secret’s coarse-coefficients are relocated 
based on a descending order criterion and then they are hidden into the host’s 
coarse-coefficients. The key keeps the original places of the secret’s coefficients 
and this is hidden into the host’s detail-coefficients. The advantage of the 
proposed architecture is that not side information is required to recover the 









The schemes of speech hiding developed in this research work have several 
advantages in relation to the schemes found in literature, but, they are not suitable for 
real-time implementation.  Since the three schemes (EMM, iEWM, speech scrambling) 
are based on the ability of adaptation of speech signals, they need to know the entire 
host signal (or target speech signal) to carry out the adaptation process. Therefore, 
there is long latency between the original speech signal and the stego (or scrambled) 
speech signal. Consequently, it is necessary to review the characteristics of the 
hardware covert communications schemes. 
In literature there are some schemes of speech hiding on hardware devices. For 
example, the authors of [89] use a secret key of a Pseudo-Noise (PN) sequence (by 
performing a XOR operation with the clock signal) to generate an encrypted speech 
signal (which is like a noise signal and is clearly dissimilar to the original speech one). 
In [45], the authors use a key based on the Euler’s numerical solution of chaotic 
equations to generate the encrypted speech signal. On the other hand, hardware-based 
speech steganographic schemes use LSB substitution, SS or SSA techniques. In [90] a 
speech hiding scheme is proposed which uses a SS scheme and a PN sequence. The 
approach presented in [91] uses a chirp signal to embed the secret message instead of a 
PN sequence. Summarizing, most of the hardware covert communications schemes use 
a PN or chaotic sequence to hide the secret message and the key it is related to control 
parameters. These kinds of approaches have two disadvantages: firstly, the secret key 
must be transmitted as side information; secondly, if the control parameters are 
discovered, the secret message is discovered too.  
Taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the known schemes, a 
desirable hardware speech hiding scheme should have the following characteristics: 
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(i) The key should be generated by an adaptive process. A fixed-key can be 
more vulnerable than an adaptive-key because the former depends on 
initial control parameters and the latter does not. On the other hand, the key 
should be hidden into the transmitted speech signal and therefore side 
information is not necessary to recover the secret message.  
(ii) The hiding capacity of the SS and SSA schemes can be enhanced if the full 
wavelet coefficients are used to hide the secret information. Nevertheless, 
the average number of bits hidden into every wavelet coefficient should not 
be higher than 8 (to obtain a highly transparent stego signal).  
(iii) Finally, the masking property of the HAS should be applied by frames.  It 
will decrease the latency of the system, so that the system can work in real-
time. 
The purpose of the current proposal is to supply an embedded speech hiding 
scheme with higher hiding capacity than the related works and with a self-adjusted and 
self-contained secret key. The scheme works into a steganographic model. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. A brief state of the art of the 
embedded covert communications systems is presented in Section 6.2. The embedding 
and extraction modules are explained in Section 6.3 and their hardware design is 
described in Section 6.4.  The main results of the proposed scheme are shown in 
Section 6.5.  Some concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.6 and the references 
are listed in Section 6.7. 
 
  
6.2. Real-time, Speech-in-speech hiding scheme 
Like the EWM and iEWM schemes the proposed embedded speech-in-speech 
hiding scheme works with two modules: the embedding module and the extraction 
module. In the first one, the secret speech signal is hidden into the host speech signal by 
using an adaptive key. The stego signal transmits both the secret message and the key. 
In the second one, the secret speech signal is recovered from the stego speech signal. 
Unlike EWM and iEWM the secret key is not side information and the system works in 
real-time operation. 
The current scheme is LSB-based with the following characteristics:  
(i) The hiding process is carried out in the wavelet domain.  Both signals, the 
speech signal and the host speech signal, are decomposed by using the 
DWT. 
(ii) Only half of the secret´s coefficients are hidden into the host signal.  Since 
the coarse coefficients keep the most relevant energy of the signal, only the 
coarse-secret´s coefficients are hidden and the detail-secret´s coefficients 
are discarded. Therefore, the compression ratio (CR) into the system is 
two. 
(iii) An adaptive key relocates the coarse-secret’s coefficients before the hiding 
process 
(iv) The coarse-host’s coefficients hide the relocated coarse-secret’s 
coefficients. 
(v) The key is hidden into the detail-host’s coefficients. The system does not 
require side information to recover the secret message. 
(vi)  The recovered secret message has the same plain-text of the original secret 
message but with slightly lower quality.  
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Table 6.1 shows the nomenclature used in the modules.  Each module is 
described as follows. 
 
Table 6.1. Nomenclature in the speech-in-speech hiding scheme. [92] 
Embedding module and extraction module 
Symbol Definition Symbol Definition 
h host signal, time domain rkey recovered key 
hc host’s coarse-coefficient rssc recovered ssc 
hd host’s detail-coefficient rsc recovered sc 
hcd hc with delay rs recovered secret message 
hdd hd with delay g stego signal, time domain 
s secret message, time domain gc stego’s coarse-coefficient 
sc secret’s coarse-coefficient gd stego’s detail-coefficient 
ssc sorted sc   
key Key   
 
6.2.1. Embedding module 
In this module a speech signal of 8-bits is hidden into a speech signal of 16-bits of 
the same time-scale and with m samples.  The host message is transformed in wavelet 
domain and its coarse- and detail-coefficients are obtained, while the secret message is 
decomposed and its coarse-coefficients are obtained. With the purpose to increase the 
difficulty to discover the secret message, the secret’s coarse-coefficients are relocated 
by a sorting process. Therefore, the sorted secret’s coarse-coefficients are hidden into 
the host’s coarse-coefficients and their original positions (key) are hidden into the 
host’s detail-coefficients. The key is self-adjusted and self-contained in the transmitted 
signal (stego signal). Since the module is suitable for real-time operation, the sorting 
block works with N coefficients, with N<<m. Once the secret’s coarse-coefficients and 
the key have been hidden into the host’s coefficients, the stego signal is obtained by the 
wavelet reconstruction of the modified host’s coefficients. The procedure is illustrated 
in Figure 6.1.  It contains the following blocks: dwthost, dwtsecret, sorting, delay, 
idwtstego. Every block is described as follows. 
 
Figure 6.1. Block diagram of the embedding module. [92] 
 
(a) dwthost: the host signal is decomposed by using the Discrete Wavelet 
Transform (DWT). At the output of this block, the host’s coarse-coefficients and 









DWT        (6.1) 
Where h corresponds to the host signal in time domain, hc corresponds to 
the host’s coarse-coefficients and hd to the host’s detail-coefficients. One host’s 
coarse-coefficient and one host’s detail-coefficient are calculated every two clock 
cycles.  
(b) dwtsecret: in this block, the secret’s coarse-coefficients are obtained 
according to: 
scs
DWT →        (6.2) 
Where s is the secret signal in time domain and sc are the secret’s coarse-
coefficients. In the current block, the secret’s detail-coefficients are not 
calculated. In a similar way to the previous block, one secret’s coarse-coefficient 
is calculated every two clock cycles.   




(c) Sorting: this block sorts sc in descending order within a frame equal to 
N. There are two outputs: the sorted secret’s coarse-coefficients, ssc, and their 
original positions, key.  For example, if sc=[20, 22, 15, 30, 12, 28, 19, 24], then 
ssc=[30, 28, 24, 22, 20, 19, 15] and key=[4, 6, 8, 2, 1, 7, 3]. Since one secret’s 
coarse-coefficient is generated every two clock cycles, to sort N secret’s coarse-
coefficients 2N clock cycles are required, and the sorted data is available in the 
following two clock cycles. The choice of N is driven by the trade-off among the 
robustness of the key, the hardware complexity and the delay of the system.  If N 
increases, the robustness of the key is better, but the latency and the hardware 
complexity increase, too. It is explained in detail in Section 6.3. 
(d) Delay: the purpose of this block is to synchronize the delays into the 
embedding module. The host’s coarse-coefficients and the host’s detail-
coefficients are delayed 2N+2 clock cycles. The outputs of this block provide a 
delayed version of hc (hcd) and a delayed version of hd (hdd).  
(e) idwstego: this block reconstructs the stego signal from the stego’s 
coarse-coefficients and the stego’s detail-coefficients.  The stego’s coarse-
coefficients, gc, are obtained from hcd and ssc. Without loss of generality, if the 
length of hcd is 17-bits and the length of ssc is 9-bits, gc is calculated according to: 
gc=hcd(16:9)&ssc(8:0)     (6.3) 
where & is the concatenation operator. In this notation, the Most 
Significant Bit (MSB) is 16 and the LSB is 0.  
In a similar way, the stego’s detail-coefficients, gd, are obtained from hdd 
and the key. If the length of hdd is 16 bits and the length of key is 7 bits, gd is 
defined as: 
gd=hdd(16:8)&key(6:0)&’0’     (6.4) 
Since the length of the key is 7-bits, N is up to 127. The least significant bit 
of the stego’s detail-coefficient, gd, is forced to be an even value in order to 
minimize the reconstruction error.  This is fully explained in Section 6.4. 
Once gc and gd have been calculated, the stego signal in time domain is 








      (6.5) 
Where g is the stego signal, in time domain.  This speech signal has 
embedded both the secret message and the adaptive-key. It is expected that the 
stego signal will be similar to the host signal since the most significant bits of the 
host’s coarse-coefficients and host’s detail-coefficients are preserved. 
 
6.2.2. Extraction module 
In this module the secret message is recovered from the stego signal. Firstly, the 
stego signal is decomposed using the DWT; secondly the key is obtained from the 
stego’s detail-coefficients while the secret’s coarse-coefficients are obtained from the 
stego’s coarse-coefficients.  Once the secret’s coarse-coefficients have been relocated 
according to the key, the IDWT is applied.  The output is the recovered secret message.  
It is expected that the recovered secret message will be similar but not equal to the 
original secret message since the secret’s detail-coefficients were not hidden. A small 
difference between them exists.  
This module contains the following blocks: dwtstego, reverse and idwsecret. It is 
illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2. Block diagram of the extraction module. [92] 
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(a) dwtstego: the stego signal is decomposed by using the DWT. At the 
output of this block, the stego’s coarse-coefficients and the stego’s detail-








DWT         (6.6) 
The gc contains the secret’s coarse-coefficients while gd contains the key. It 
is necessary to extract the least significant bits of the above coefficients, 
according to: 
rssc=gc(8:0)        (6.7) 
rkey=gd(7:1)        (6.8) 
where rssc and rkey are the recovered ssc and the recovered key. The length 
of rssc is 9-bits, while the length of rkey is 7-bits (these lengths corresponds to 
the case that the host signal is 16-bits and the secret message is 8-bits).  
(b) reverse: in this block, the relocation process done in the sorting block is 
reversed.  The purpose is to relocate rssc with the information contained into 
rkey to obtain the recovered secret’s coarse-coefficients, rsc. For example, if 
rssc=[30, 28, 24, 22, 20, 19, 15] and rkey=[4, 6, 8, 2, 1, 7, 3] then rsc=[20, 22, 15, 
30, 12, 28, 19, 24].  It is worth noting that rsc is the same sc used in the example 
of the embedding module. In an ideal case in which the principle of perfect 
reconstruction of the wavelet transform is satisfied,  rsc must be equal to sc, and 
in a similar way rkey must be equal to key. In Section 6.3 we will explain further 
this concept.  
(c) idwsecret: in this block the recovered secret message, rs, is obtained 
from the recovered secret’s coarse-coefficients, rcs, according to: 
rsrsc
IDWT →         (6.9) 
Since the secret’s detail-coefficients were not hidden in the embedding module, 
the recovered secret message is similar but no equal to the original secret message. 


























6.3. Principle of Perfect Reconstruction (PR) and general design of the 
Discrete Wavelet Transform 
One of the most important aspects to take into account in the design of the dwt-
idwt blocks in hardware is to guarantee the principle of perfect reconstruction. If a 
signal is decomposed by using the DWT and then it is reconstructed by using the IDWT 
-with the same wavelet base-, it is expected that the reconstructed signal is exactly 
equal to the original one. This is the principle of perfect reconstruction. 
In hardware, the weights of the decomposition and reconstruction filters can be 
slightly different from the theoretical ones because of the quantization process.  The 
higher the quantization error, the higher the reconstruction error, and therefore the 
reconstructed signal will be not similar to the original one. Because of that, the 
quantization of the weights is an important aspect to take into account in the design of 
the topology of the dwt-idwt blocks. 
 
Figure 6.3. Decomposition and reconstruction: non-polyphase scheme. [93] 
The non-polyphase scheme of the decomposition and reconstruction stages is 
illustrated in Figure 6.3. The low-pass decomposition filter is represented by h0, the 
high-pass decomposition filter by h1, the low-pass reconstruction filter by g0, the high-
pass reconstruction filter by g1, while 2↓ represents a down-sampling process and 2↑ 
an up-sampling process, by factor of two.  
To guarantee aliasing cancellation and perfect reconstruction, the following 
conditions must be satisfied [94], [95]: 
0=(-z)]}(z).G[H+(-z)](z).G{[H 1/2 1100     (6.10) 
And  
m -
1100 z=(z)]}(z).G[H+(z)](z).G{[H 1/2     (6.11) 
If a constant value, kte, is factorized in all the four filters, equations (6.10) and 




















































































































  (6.13) 
According to (6.12) and (6.13) a topology that factorizes the term kte in all the 
four filters and includes a post-amplifier block with gain of kte2 satisfies the principle of 
PR as its original topology.  
With the purpose to have a more efficient architecture of the decomposition 
stage, the non-polyphase scheme is replaced with a polyphase scheme and the input 
signal is down-sampled (split) before the filtering process. Unlike the non-polyphase 
scheme half of the results are not wasted. Figure 6.4 illustrates the general design in 
which h0even   and h1even filters the even part of the input signal, xeven, while h0odd   and h1odd 




Figure 6.4. General design of the dwt-idwt stages. [93] 
Then, the coarse (c) and detail (d) coefficients are obtained as follows: 
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  (6.14) 
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  (6.15) 
And the reconstructed signal, xr, is calculated as follows: 
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  (6.16) 
Where cr contains the reconstructed-coarse coefficients and dr contains the 
reconstructed-detail coefficients. The above equations not only guarantee the PR; they 



















6.4. Hardware design of the speech-in-speech hiding scheme 
The proposed scheme is LSB-based with adaptive key, in wavelet domain. The 
generic blocks of the embedding and extraction modules are: dwt, idwt, sorting, reverse 
and delay. The blocks dwthost, dwtsecret and dwtstego are based on the generic block 
dwt while the blocks idwtstego and idwtsecret are based on the generic block idwt. 
Since the Discrete Wavelet Transform plays an important role in the proposed scheme, 
in the first part of this section we will discuss the design of the blocks dwt-idwt which 
satisfies the principle of Perfect Reconstruction. Thereafter, we will present the design 
of the blocks sorting, reverse and delay. 
 
6.4.1. Decomposition and reconstruction: dwt and idwt blocks 
With the purpose to have efficient hardware architecture of the wavelet 
transform, the following characteristics have been selected: 
(a) Biorthogonal base. The symmetry of this kind of wavelets reduces the 
quantity of operations. Specifically, it is selected the 5/3 wavelet base. 
(b) Multiplierless scheme.  In this topology the multiplications are replaced 
with shifts and therefore the hardware resources decrease. 
(c) Quantization of the weights of the filters based on rational integers.  The 
quantization error is significantly lower than in fixed point format. 
Taking into account the above characteristics and the design presented in Section 
























=  ( ) { }126-21kg 1a =   ( ) 81kg 1b =  (6.20) 
Where ho(k), h1(k), g0(k), g1(k) are the lowpass-decomposition, highpass-
decomposition, lowpass-reconstruction and highpass-reconstruction filters. It is worth 
noting that the weights of the filters have been divided by the term √2.  This is equal to 
kte presented in Section 6.3.  
Since all the terms (h0a(k), h0b(k), h1a(k), h1b(k), g0a(k), g0b(k), g1a(k), g1b(k),) can be 
represented as a sum of power of two (SPT) , they can be computed by right-shifts and 
left-shifts, in binary representation. A left-shift is a multiplication by power of two (i.e. 
20*data, 21*data, 22*data,..) while a right-shift is equal to the ceiling operator of the 
division by a power of two (i.e. data/20, data/21, data/22,..). Therefore, the 
truncation error appears only in the division process if data is an odd number. For 
example, if data=101101b a division by 2 with one-right-shift is 10110b and the error is 
½ LSB, but if data is an even number, i.e. data=101100b the division by 2 with one-
right-shift is 10110b and the error is 0-LSBs. The grouping of the weights of the filters 
by integer constants and the post-amplifier stage by power of two permit to carry out 
all of the hardware operations by right-shifts and left-shifts.  
Additionally, the proposed design satisfies the desirable condition of the 
Quadrature Mirror Filters (QMF) in which G0(z)=H1(-z) and G1(z)=-H0(-z). It is a 
sufficient condition to guarantee anti-aliasing and it is also an efficient condition to 
have a low hardware cost.  
The structure of the dwt block is illustrated in Figure 6.5. The input signal is split 
and the even (xeven) and odd parts (xodd) are shifted and added to obtain coarse and 
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detail coefficients. The scheme does not use multiplier units and instead of that all 
operations (multiplications and divisions) are carried out with five right-shifts and five 
left-shifts. It takes advantage of the symmetry property of the biorthogonal filters (e.g. 
one left-shift is used to compute 2{xodd(n)+xodd(n-1)}). Additionally, a small number of 
adders are used in the topology.  
Since the input signal is split, the coarse and detail coefficients are updated every 
two cycles.  In the current design, the input signal is 16-bits, the coarse coefficients are 
17-bits and the detail coefficients are 16-bits. 
 
Figure 6.5.  Scheme of the dwt block. [93] 
To reconstruct the signal, the idwt block is designed. Like the dwt block, it uses a 
multiplierless topology. Figure 6.6 illustrates the design: detail coefficients are 
represented as d(n), coarse coefficients as c(n), oversampled detail coefficients as 
dover(n), oversampled coarse coefficients as cover(n), reconstructed detail coefficients as 
dr(n), reconstructed coarse coefficients as cr(n) and the denoising signal as xden. 
Firstly, the coarse and detail coefficients are oversampled, secondly, dover(n) and cover(n) 
are shifted and added, thirdly, dr(n) and the cr(n) are added and finally [cr(n)+dr(n)] is 
multiplied by the term kte2 (by using one left-shift). Since the wavelet coefficients are 
oversampled, the reconstructed signal is obtained in every clock cycle. In the current 
design, the coarse coefficients are 17-bits, the detail coefficients are 16-bits and the 
reconstructed (denoising) signal is 16-bits.  
 
Figure 6.6. Scheme of the idwt block. [93] 
The highest reconstruction error of the dwt and idwt blocks is 2-LSBs and it 
means that if the input signal is 16 bits (in signed format), the highest error is up to 3 of 
32767 or in other words it is 0.0092%.  
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6.4.2. Sorting and reverse 
There are several architectures proposed in the literature for sorting data.  The 
schemes can be classified as sorting networks and linear sorters.  The former approach 
sorts parallel data while the latter sorts serial data. Since in the proposed design a new 
data appears every clock cycle, the scheme based on sorting networks is discarded. In 
the case of linear sorters, the traditional approaches use bidirectional data-shifts in a 
continuous stream. Since the length of the array is fixed, one number is deleted from 
the array to give a place to the new number in every clock cycle, and the criterion is 
based on, for example, a first input- first output (FIFO) scheme [96], [97]. Like the 
traditional approaches, the length of the current arrays is fixed too, but the sorting 
block works with non-overlapped frames. For example, the first N numbers are sorted 
and the result is given in the following N cycles of the clock signal at the same time that 
the second frame is sorted. In other words, while the frame k is sorted, the results of 
the frame k-1 are supplied in every clock cycle. Unlike the schemes of linear sorter 
based on a FIFO scheme which works with two arrays (one for the sorted-array and 
one for the rank-array), the proposed scheme works with four arrays, two sorted-
arrays and two rank-arrays.   One sorted-array (and rank-array) is the original and the 
other is the copy. 
Figure 6.7 shows an example of descending sorting using a FIFO-based scheme 
and a non-overlapped scheme, for N=8. In the first N clock cycles, both schemes sort the 
data in the same form, therefore the sorted-array and rank-array have the same results.  
The difference between them is that in the non-overlapped scheme a copy of the rank-
array and sorted-array is made in the clock cycle N. In the clock cycle equal to 9 (or 
N+1), the results of the sorted-array and rank-array are completely different between 
the schemes, i.e. in the FIFO-based scheme the new data (7) is added to the sorted array 
while in the non-overlapped scheme the process of sorting begins again. When the 
clock cycle is equal to 18 (or 2N), the sorted-arrays of the schemes are equal, but the 
rank-arrays are different.  It is noticed that the highest value of the rank-array in the 
non-overlapped scheme is N, while in the FIFO-based scheme is the current clock cycle. 
Again, a copy of the sorted-array and rank-array is made in the clock cycle equal to 2N. 
This process is repeated until the total of data is reached. 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Sorting process with the FIFO-based and non-overlapped schemes. 
[92] 
 
In hardware, the non-overlapped sorting block includes comparators, 
multiplexers, D-type flip-flops (FF) and a counter.  At the beginning, the FFs of the 
sorted-arrays are set to the lowest number into the range, i.e. -127 if the data is 
encoded with 8-bits, while the FFs of the rank-arrays are set to zero. The sorting 
132 
 
process is done between cycles 1 and N of the counter; when the counter reaches N, the 
sorted-array and rank-array are copied and the counter is set to 1, again. In the 
following cycles, while the sorting process is done again, the sorted data and their 
ranks of the above group are provided one by one in every clock cycle.    
 
 
Figure 6.8. Reverse process with the non-overlapped scheme. [92] 
 
On the other hand, the aim of the reverse block is to put the data in the original 
places. It uses the sorted-array and the rank-array. Since one sorted and one rank 
number enters every clock cycle, the reverse process uses N cycles to relocate the 
places.  Figure 6.8 shows an example of the reverse process. The first group of N 
elements is reversed between the clock cycles N+1 and 2N. At the beginning, the 
reverse-array contains null-data and in every clock cycle one position is replaced to the 
current data of copy sorted-array. Once the N elements have been reversed, a copy of 
the reverse-array is made and the reverse process begins again. 
In a similar way to the sorting block, the hardware resources of the reverse block 
include comparators, FFs and a counter. When the counter reaches the value of N, a 
copy of the reverse-array is made and the reverse process begins again in the following 
clock cycle. One value of the copy of the reverse-array is provided every clock cycle. 
Since the secret’s coarse-coefficients are updated every two clock cycles, the real 
latency between the first secret’s coarse-coefficient and the first sorted secret’s coarse-
coefficient is 2(N+1) instead of (N+1) of the previous example.  
6.4.3. Delay 
The aim of this block is to synchronize the data into the embedding module.  It 
uses z-1 units interconnected in two synchronous arrays and the total delay by signal is 
2N+2. Since the host’s coarse-coefficients and the host’s detail-coefficients must be 
delayed, the delay block works with two inputs and two outputs (Figure 6.9).  The 
length of the host’s coarse-coefficients is 17-bits while the length of the host’s detail-
coefficients is 16-bits (for a host signal encoded with 16-bits).   
 
Figure 6.9. Scheme of the delay block.  
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6.5. Hardware performance 
 
In this section we validate the hardware architecture of the speech-in-speech 
hiding scheme.  The embedding and extraction modules are modeled using VHDL and 
they are compiled and simulated using ISE Foundation 12.4 and ModelSim SE 6.4a, 
respectively. The host signal is encoded with 16-bits, the secret message with 8-bits, the 
stego signal with 16-bits, and the recovered secret message with 8-bits.  
 
6.5.1. Hardware Resources 
With the purpose of measuring the hardware resources of the proposed design; 
we select the Spartan-6 xc6slx45 device for the implementation. In Table 6.2 the total 
amount of resources by block (compiled separately), the percentage of the used 
resources, and the latency, are given. The total of resources of the selected FPGA is 
supplied between brackets. As expected, the used resources in main (entire design) are 
not the sum of the used resources of the eight blocks. If N is 8, the latency of the 
embedding (or extraction) module will be 23 clock cycles and the total latency of the 
system will be 47 clock cycles. If fs=8 KHz, the latency of each module will be 2,87 ms 
and the total latency will be 5,87 ms; but if N is 127, the latency of every module will be 
65 ms. 
According to Table 6.2, the maximum delay per block is extremely low in relation 
to the time between consecutive samples, ∆t, in speech signals (typically ∆t=125000 
ns). Therefore, the delay between the host signal and the stego signal would not be 
perceptible by the HAS. Since for a real-time speech communication system, the highest 
mouth-to-ear delay should be up to 200 ms, the low latency of the embedding module 
allows that the speech signal can be hidden into a high quality transmission scheme. On 
the other hand, the speech signal can be recovered in real-time, too. 





















dwthost 99(<1%) 130 (<1%) 87 (7%)  51 (23%) 5.32 L1=2 
dwtsecret 43 (<1%) 68 (<1%) 20 (2%) 19 (9%) 6.04 L2=2 
delay  318(<1%) 299 (∼1%) 299 (25%) 68 (31%) 2.64 L3=2(N+1) 
sorting (N=8) 240 (<1%)  408(∼1%) 139 (11%) 25(11%) 6.14 L4=2(N+1) 
idwtstego 160 (<1%)  138(<1%) 68(6%) 50(22%) 5.11 L5=3 
dwstego 79(<1%) 130(<1%) 66(5%) 32(15%) 5.17 L6=2 
reverse 156(<1%) 185(<1%) 150(12%) 26(12%) 3.49 L7=2(N+1) 
idwtsecret 40(<1%) 27(<1%) 22(2%) 19(9%) 2.94 L8=3 
Main (total) 797(1%) 849(3%) 427(35%) 34(15%) 7.28 
*LT= 
LT1+LT2+1 
*LT: total latency; LT1: latency embedding module; LT2: latency extraction module; 
LT1=L2+L4+L5; LT2=L6+L7+L8 
In relation to the hardware resources, the design is extremely simple and uses 
only small percentage of the available resources of the selected FPGA. It is remarkable 
that the dwt-idwt blocks use lower resources that the sorting-reverse blocks. It means 
that the selected scheme (polyphase), the representation of the weights of the FIR 
filters by integer data, and the multiplierless topology (using left-shifts and right-shifts) 
are adequate options to obtain a low cost hardware and low reconstruction error. 
The generation of the adaptive-key is carried out by the sorting block. Since N is 
up to 127 and the current design uses N=8, it is important to estimate the hardware 
resources when N is higher. Firstly, the macro statistics of the sorting block for N=8 are 
shown in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3.  Macro statistics of the sorting block. [92] 
Adders/Substractor Register Comparators Multiplexers 
5-bit adder 1-bit 5-bit 9-bit 9-bit 5-bit 2-to-1 9-bit 2-to-1 
2 1 18 16 7 41 42 
 
Most of the hardware resources of the sorting block are comparators and 
multiplexers.  The number of comparators is N-1 while the number of multiplexers is 
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up to 2*(N-1)*(N-2).  If N=100 it is expected that the total number of comparators will 
be 99 and the total of multiplexers will be 19400, approximately. Although the 
hardware resources increases with respect to the current resources (N=8), these 
resources would be less than the available resources of the FPGA. In other words, the 
speech-in-speech hiding architecture may work with a higher value of N. 
6.5.2. Reconstruction error  
Since one of the most important characteristics in the proposed model is to have 
an extremely low reconstruction error according to the principle of perfect 
reconstruction, the validation of the dwt-idwt blocks in terms of the reconstruction 
error is taken into account.  It is measured as the difference between the input data and 
the output data expressed in the total number of LSBs. To test this error, the 
architecture is connected as in Figure 6.10.  
 
Figure 6.10.  Block diagram of the decomposition-reconstruction system. [93] 
Then, if the reconstructed signal, xr, is very close to the input signal, x, the 
reconstruction error is low; otherwise the reconstruction error is high. Figure 6.10 
illustrates a simulation of the process. The plot shows the clock signal (clk), the reset 
signal (rst), the input signal (x), the reconstructed signal (xr), the coarse coefficient 






Figure 6.11. Simulation of dwt and idwt blocks: (a) 1st to 16th cycles, (b) 17th to 
32th cycles. [93] 
In a frame-by-frame design, a border extension is applied to the input signal with 
the purpose of smoothing the first and last coefficients, but in a real-time design it is 
not suitable. For this reason, the first coarse and first detail coefficients are not a 
proper representation of the input signal (and they should be ignored).  The proper 
output is in the following even cycle and therefore the latency of the dwt block is two. 
For example, the 1st input of Figure 11a (15254) has its coarse (13129) and detail 
coefficients (426) in the 3rd clock cycle.  These coefficients are updated every two cycles 
according to the theory. On the other hand, the 1st output (15254) is in the 6th cycle; 
therefore the latency of the idwt block is three. The 1st - 5th outputs should be zero; a 
small value is due to the quantization process. Finally, it is worth noting that if the input 
signal is an even number, the reconstructed one is an even number too and the 
reconstruction error is zero; but if the input signal is an odd number, the reconstructed 
signal is an even number and the error is +/-1. Therefore, the highest reconstruction 
error is equal to 2-LSBs. 
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6.5.3. Validation of the entire design 
In this section, the speech-in-speech hiding scheme is simulated on ModelSim 
6.4.a. The embedding and extraction modules have been interconnected in the same 
architecture. At the input, the host signal (host) and the secret message (8-bits) from 
two real speech signals with time-scale of 1s are supplied. The output provides the 
recovered secret message (8-bits). The internal signals are: the stego signal (stego), the 
secret’s coarse-coefficients (scoarse), the recovered secret’s coarse-coefficients 
(srcoarse), the key (ks) and the recovered key (ksr). In order to illustrate the adaptive-
key generation with a small number of clock cycles, it is selected N=8. In Figure 6.12 the 
simulation results between clock cycles 2200 and 2260 are provided. The following 
notation to highlight the inter-block latency is used: stars for host signal and stego 
signal; triangles for secret message and recovered secret message; squares for secret’s 
coarse-coefficient and recovered secret’s coarse-coefficient; and circles for key and 
recovered key. 
 
Figure 6.12. Simulation of the embedding & extraction modules, clock cycles [2200 
2260]. [92] 
To demonstrate the latency between the host signal and the stego signal (latency 
of the embedding module), the host signal equal to 435 is selected (clock cycle number 
2203).  The corresponding value is the stego signal equal to 780 (clock cycle number 
2226).  Then, the latency is 23 clock cycles. Secondly, we select the key equal to 8 (clock 
cycle number 2208) and its corresponding recovered key equal to 8 (clock cycle number 
2214), in this case the latency is equal to 6. Thirdly, the secret’s coarse-coefficient equal 
to 30 (clock cycle number 2204) and its corresponding recovered secret’s coarse-
coefficient equal to 29 (clock cycle number 2246) illustrate the latency between the 
above signals, which is equal to 42. Finally, the total latency of the system (embedding 
module + extraction module) is obtained from the secret message and the recovered 
secret message. The secret message equal to 12 (clock cycle number 2200) and the 
recovered secret message equal to 10 (clock cycle number 2247), then the total latency 
of the system is 47. 
It is worth noting that the recovered key is exactly equal to the original key 
because in the embedding module the stego’s detail-coefficient was forced to be an 
even value; then the reconstruction error is zero. In the case of the recovered secret’s 
coarse-coefficient there is a small error (2-LSBs) in relation to the secret’s coarse-
coefficient, because the stego’s coarse-coefficient is an even or odd number  and the  
term coefficient*sample/8 is calculated as coefficient*sample/8; where . is the ceiling 
operator.   
In order to illustrate the similarity between the host signal and the stego signal, 
and between the secret message and the recovered secret message, the result of the 
entire simulation is provided in Figure 6.13. 
The simulation works with two speech signals (host and secret) with time-scale of 
1-second and sampling frequency, fs, of 8 KHz. The host and the stego signals are in the 
range [-32768 32768], while the secret and the recovered secret message (secretr) are 
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in the range [-128 128]. According to Figure 6.11, it is remarkable that the secret 
message is hidden into the region of silence as the region of non-silence of the host 
signal; however, the stego signal is very similar to the host one. Since the latency of the 
embedding module (23 clock cycles) is very low in relation to fs, the delay between the 
host and the stego signal is quasi-imperceptible. It allows to transmit the stego signal in 
real-time. 
 
Figure 6.13. Simulation of the speech-in-speech hiding scheme. [92] 
6.5.4. Comparing to related works: dwt-idwt blocks 
In wavelet-based data hiding PR is an outstanding requirement of the system and 
therefore the quantization process plays an important role in the design.  However, 
other parameters like latency and hardware resources are important, too. In this 
context, the selection of the “best” design is based on the good trade-off among 
reconstruction error, latency and hardware cost. In order to illustrate the strengths of 
our design, in this section some remarkable designs of multiplier-based and 
multiplierless-based schemes are analyzed.  
Multiplier-based schemes: the schemes based on this topology use multiplier 
units to multiply the input signal by the weights of the FIR filters. Since the multiplier 
unit sums the size of its inputs, the product can exceed the minimum number of bits to 
represent the data (e.g. 101*10=01010), and then the hardware resources are not as 
low as possible. This is the main weakness of the multiplier-based schemes. In [98] a 
multiplier topology of the lifting scheme is presented. Its main characteristic is that the 
size of the quantized weights can be selected according to a desired data precision. If 
the size increases, the precision increases too and the quantization error decreases, but 
the hardware cost increases. Since all the weights of the filters require long word-bits 
and it uses a multiplier topology, this design requires a higher number of resources. 
Unlike [98], the design presented in [99] works with fixed size of the quantization of 
the weights. The main disadvantage is that its quantization error is high (∼15%) and 
therefore it is not appropriate for denoising systems (but it is for other kind of 
applications like detection). Both designs are complex in terms of hardware cost. 
Multiplierless-based schemes: unlike the multiplier-based schemes, the 
current ones use shifts and sum operations to carry out the multiplication process. The 
main point is the representation of the weights of the filters with the minimum number 
of bits. The lower the number of nonzero bits, the lower is the number of shifts. 
Typically, the formats are fixed-point, Canonical Signed Digit (CSD) and ratio of integer 
numbers. The CSD format is a special case of fixed-point in which the bit 1 represents a 
positive power of two and 1 a negative power of two (e.g. 
b110.0  is equal to 0.5-
0.125=0.375).  The designs in [100]-[102] use the CSD format to compute the 9/7 
wavelet base. According to their results, the best design in terms of quantization error 
is not the best in terms of latency. The number of SPT terms is at least 21.  
With the purpose to reduce the quantization error, the weights of the filters can 
be represented as ratio of integer numbers.  In [103], [104]  is designed a 5/3 wavelet 
base for the lifting scheme. Although most of the weights have a finite representation as 
rational terms, the gain (√2) is approximated to 44/32 and it gives a high quantization 
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error (∼2.5%). The advantage is that all denominators are power of two and they can 
be easily made by right-shifts. In [105] is shown a wavelet-denoising system by using 
rational 9/7 wavelet base. The denominator of the rational terms is 64 and the 
numerators are in the range [1 46]. Therefore, the size of the internal signals is higher 
than the size of the input speech signal (more hardware resources) and they need at 
least 35 shifts. In our design, the highest denominator is 8 and the numerators of the 
rational terms are in the range [1 6]. It gives a low number of shifts operations (10) and 
therefore a low hardware complexity. The latency of our dwt block is significantly 
lower than in the above designs. Additionally, unlike other designs [106], the gain of the 
decomposition filter is the same as the reconstruction filter (|H(0)|=|G(0)|) and this 
satisfies the requirement of the QMFs. Some of the remarkable works are shown in 
Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4. Comparison of multiplierless-based schemes. [93].  
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6.5.5. Comparing to related works: the entire design 
In this section, it is analyzed the quality of the stego signal and the recovered 
secret message of the proposed architecture. Firstly, the differences between host 
signal and stego signal, and between secret message and recovered secret message, are 
measured. Secondly, the Signal-to-Noise-Ratio (SNR) and the Squared Pearson 
Correlation Coefficient, ρ2, are calculated for every pair of signals.  Finally, the results 
are compared to those obtained from other schemes. With the purpose to obtain the 
difference between host signal and stego signal, and between secret message and 
recovered secret message, we include the diff block which calculates the error between 
the above signals. Since the latency between the host signal and the stego signal is 23 (if 
N=8) and the latency between the secret message and the recovered secret message is 
47, the diff block keeps 23 samples of the host signal and 47 samples of the secret 
message.  
 
Figure 6.14.  Output at the transmitter and at the receiver, and their error signals. 
[92]  
 
Figure 6.14 shows in descending order: the stego signal (stego), the difference 
between the stego and the host signal (diffh), the recovered secret message (secretr) 
and the difference between the secret message and the recovered secret message 
(diffs). The stego signal is in the range [-32768 32768] while diffh is in [-600 600], 
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secretr is in [-128 128] and diffs is in [-128 128]. It can be noticed that diffh is similar to 
white noise while diffs is not. In terms of percentage, the difference between host and 
stego is up to 1.8%, per sample; while in the case of the diffs, the difference between 
secret and secretr, most of the samples are under 2% but there are a few up to 80%. 
Since the recovered secret message only contains the information from the secret’s 
coarse-coefficients, the percentage in diffs is higher than the percentage in diffh; in 
other words, it is expected that the quality of the stego signal will be slightly higher 
than the quality of the recovered secret message. 
In order to objectively assess the quality of the output signals (stego and secretr), 
the proposed scheme is simulated in Matlab together with LSB, FM and EWM, and the 
SNR and SPCC are measured in every scheme. Unlike LSB, FM and EWM schemes are 
not suitable for real time processing because they need to know in advance the host 
signal and the secret message. The detail of the algorithms LSB, FM and EWM are 
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Where x, y, are the input signal and the output signal, respectively. At the 
embedding module, the input signal is the host and the output signal is the stego; while 
in the extraction module, the input signal is the secret and the output signal is the 
recovered secret. SNR measures the level of noise of the output signal in relation to the 
input signal, while ρ2 measures the level of similarity between the input and output 
signals (according to eq. 3.2.). The higher SNR and ρ2, the better is the quality of the 
output signal. The results of the simulations are illustrated in Table 6.5. 
 
 
Table 6.5. Quality of the stego signal and the recovered secret message. [92] 
Method 
Host & Stego Secret & Recovered Secret 
SNR ρ2 SNR ρ2 
FM  22.66 0.993 13.99 0.974 
iEWM  30.23 0.998 30.64 0.999 
LSB  33.88 0.999 18.14 0.985 
Proposed  33.88 0.999 16.65 0.978 
 
In relation to the stego signal, the current proposal provides the same results as 
the LSB scheme and better than the FM scheme. In relation to the recovered secret 
message, the quality decreases in relation to the LSB scheme but it is better than the FM 
scheme, again. Although the best global results correspond to the iEWM scheme, that is 
not suitable for real-time implementation. On the other hand, the current proposal has 


















The wavelet-based speech-in-speech hiding scheme encompasses decomposition, 
sorting, substitution and reconstruction. 
The dwt-idwt blocks use multiplierless topology with the following 
characteristics: 
(i) The 5/3 wavelet base is factorized so that the weights of the filters are 
represented by rational numbers of small integers. A post-scaling stage is 
added to obtain a reconstructed signal with the same dynamic range of the 
input signal.  
(ii) The symmetry property of the biorthogonal base (5/3) is taken into 
account. 
(iii) The reconstruction error is zero if the input signal is an even number and it 
is lower than 0.01% if the input signal is an odd number.  
Finally, the entire design has the following characteristics: 
(i) At the transmitter, the coarse-secret’s coefficients are relocated before the 
hiding process according to an adaptive key. The adaptive key is hidden 
into the detail-host’s coefficients. The detail-secret’s coefficients are 
discarded. 
(ii) At the receiver, the relocation process is completely reversed because the 
detail-host’s coefficients were forced (at the transmitter) to be even 
numbers and therefore the recovered secret key is exactly equal to the 
original secret key. The recovered secret message is highly similar to the 
original secret message (it is not equal because the detail-secret’s 
coefficients were not hidden).  









Although in every chapter a summary section has been included, the purpose of 
this chapter is to present the general conclusions of the research work. The 















7.1. General conclusions 
The general conclusions of the research work are: 
(i) The ability of adaptation of speech signals is a useful tool to transmit 
secure speech signals. It can be used in steganographic systems as well as 
cryptographic systems. 
(ii) It was demonstrated that the ability of adaptation is a feasible operation if 
some requirements are satisfied. The adaptation is carried out between 
sounds of different characteristics like their nature (vowels, words), the 
gender of the speaker (female, male) and the language of the plain-text.  
(iii) In the case of steganography, two schemes were proposed.  The first one is 
known as Efficient Wavelet Masking (EWM) and the second one as 
improved Efficient Wavelet Masking (iEWM). They take advantage of the 
masking property of the HAS by using an efficient process of masking based 
on the adaptation of the secret message to the host signal. 
(iv) EWM demonstrates that the statistical transparency is significantly better 
than the obtained in LSB, FM, SS and SSA. The error between the statistics 
of the host signal and the stego signal was always lower than 15%. 
Additionally, the maximum hiding capacity is higher than in SS and SSA and 
similar to LSB and FM. 
(v) iEWM has better robustness against signal manipulation than in EWM, LSB 
and FM. Its transparency is slightly lower than in EWM and the hiding 
capacity is the same.  In terms of trade-off among transparency, robustness 
and hiding capacity, iEWM is the best scheme in comparison with the 
reviewed schemes in the literature.  However, in terms of statistical 
transparency, the best is EWM. 
(vi) In the case of cryptography, a novel scheme of speech scrambling was 
proposed. Unlike traditional approaches, the scrambled speech signal is a 
legible speech signal and the permutation process is based on the 
adaptation between the secret message and a target speech signal. The 
scheme can be viewed as a special case of Time-Frequency Scrambling, TFS. 
(vii) The main advantage of the proposed speech scrambling scheme over the 
known permutation-based speech scrambling schemes is that the perfect 
secrecy is guaranteed because the key-space is equal to the secret-space 
and the scrambled-space. The mapping between the input and the output is 
one-to-one. In addition, the low residual intelligibility is satisfied as the 
high quality of the recovered secret message. 
(viii) Since both the proposed steganography scheme and the scrambling scheme 
require knowing in advance the speech signals, they are not suitable for 
real-time operation. Therefore, in the proposal on hardware devices the 
adaptation is carried out in small frames. The stego signal is obtained 
quasi-immediately at the time that the speech signal and the host signal are 
pronounced. Additionally, the transparency is similar to the obtained in 











7.2. Future work 
Although the aim of the research and its specific objectives has been covered in 
the current PhD project, some topics for a future work can be identified: 
 
(i) In the proposal, the ability of adaptation of speech signals is carried out by 
a deterministic search but there is at least one alternative to provide it. A 
heuristic search is an alternative solution and this can decrease (or not) the 
execution time. A research that compares the response time and the 
effectiveness of the algorithm is a future work. 
 
(ii) On the other hand, the adaptation per time-frames can be considered, too. 
For example, if the secret message is too long (several minutes), the 
adaptation can be carried out by time-frames of seconds and then, the 
execution time can decrease in comparison to the case when the entire 
speech signal is adapted. In this case, the key encompasses several sub-
keys. The research should analyze if additional requirements are needed as 
well as the quality of the adapted speech signal by time-frames. In a similar 













8. Thesis results dissemination 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to collect the results of the PhD research work. It 
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